Com. v. Sears, D., Com. v. Sears, D. No. 1738 MDA 2015

On June 13, 2013, Da Ran Malik Sears shot and killed Donte Marks; initial charges included involuntary manslaughter and related offenses, later consolidated with a separate information charging third‑degree murder.
Sears waived a jury; a bench trial occurred March 2–3, 2015; the court convicted him of third‑degree murder and other counts.
Physical evidence, witness testimony, and Sears’ recorded interview supported a theory that Sears pointed a .22 at the victim during an argument about watching cartoons and pulled the trigger; ballistics testing showed the gun required trigger pull to fire.
A jailhouse inmate, Gage Wood, testified about statements Sears made while incarcerated; Sears moved to suppress those statements as obtained by a government agent in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
At sentencing (Aug. 17, 2015) the court imposed an aggregate 21 to 50 years’ imprisonment after considering Sears’ age, traumatic upbringing, psychological evaluation, misconduct in custody, and the gravity of the offense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for third‑degree murder (malice)	Commonwealth: evidence (witnesses, Sears’ admissions, ballistics) proves malice beyond a reasonable doubt	Sears: shooting was accidental; lacked malice	Court: Affirmed—malice can be inferred from pointing a gun and pulling the trigger without knowing if loaded; evidence sufficient
Suppression of jailhouse statements	Commonwealth: Wood acted independently to curry favor; no government direction or promises	Sears: Wood was a government agent; statements obtained in violation of Sixth Amendment	Court: Denied suppression—facts akin to Lopez; Wood independently sought cooperation and was not shown to be an agent of law enforcement
Discretionary aspects of sentence	Sears: sentence harsh and excessive given youth, upbringing, remorse, and claimed accident	Commonwealth: long sentence justified by danger to public, offense gravity, lack of treatment history, disciplinary record	Court: Sentence not an abuse of discretion; court considered mitigating factors but found public protection and gravity required lengthy incarceration
Applicability of Franciscus to suppression claim	Sears: Franciscus requires suppression where informant acted under police direction	Commonwealth: Franciscus distinguishable; authorities did not direct Wood to elicit statements	Court: Franciscus inapplicable; record shows absence of police promises, direction, or ongoing control over Wood

Fisher v. Commonwealth, 80 A.3d 1186 (Pa. 2013) (malice is required for third‑degree murder and may be inferred from circumstances)
Woodward v. Commonwealth, 129 A.3d 480 (Pa. 2015) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
Houser v. Commonwealth, 18 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2011) (malice may be inferred from use of deadly weapon on vital part of body)
Briggs v. Commonwealth, 12 A.3d 291 (Pa. 2011) (similar principle on inference of malice from weapon use)
Garland v. Commonwealth, 63 A.3d 339 (Pa. Super. 2013) (discussing inferences of malice)
Young v. Commonwealth, 431 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1981) (pointing a gun and firing without certainty it is unloaded demonstrates legal malice)
Franciscus v. Commonwealth, 710 A.2d 1112 (Pa. 1998) (police‑directed jailhouse informant can trigger suppression)
Lopez v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 485 (Pa. 1999) (distinguishing cases where informant acted independently from those controlled by police)
Bricker v. Commonwealth, 41 A.3d 872 (Pa. Super. 2012) (appellate standard for reviewing sentencing discretion)
Walls v. Commonwealth, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa. 2007) (abuse of discretion standard for sentencing review)
Fullin v. Commonwealth, 892 A.2d 843 (Pa. Super. 2006) (factors sentencing court must consider)