Com. v. Russaw, W.
256 MDA 2017
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Dec 18, 2017Background
- Defendant William T. Russaw pled guilty to stalking, multiple counts of selling a non‑controlled substance as a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and tampering with evidence; court imposed 60 months of intermediate punishment (IP), 12 months electronic monitoring, and 12 months probation.
- Less than two months after sentencing, probation officer alleged 246 violations over the two‑month period, including: denying officer access to residence, lying, failing to report address, unpaid fines, drug use/possession, multiple cellphones, numerous unapproved outings, and allowing electronic monitor to die.
- At the revocation hearing the trial court credited the probation officer’s testimony and found the violations proven.
- Trial court revoked probation and resentenced Russaw to 1½ to 4 years’ imprisonment. Russaw filed a post‑sentence motion and timely appealed.
- On appeal, Russaw argued the total confinement sentence was clearly unreasonable and an abuse of discretion because the violations were technical (not new criminal convictions) and nonviolent. The Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether total confinement after probation revocation for technical violations was an abuse of discretion | (Commonwealth) Sentence is within court’s discretion given violations and risk of future crimes | (Russaw) Total confinement was excessive for technical, nonviolent violations and inconsistent with his rehabilitative needs | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion; record supports finding defendant likely to reoffend and vindication of court authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133 (Pa. Super. 1995) (procedural rules re: post‑sentence motion denial and appeal timeliness)
- Commonwealth v. Carterette, 83 A.3d 1031 (Pa. Super. 2013) (appealability when post‑sentence motion deemed denied by operation of law)
- Commonwealth v. Smith, 669 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 1996) (revocation sentencing vested in trial court discretion)
- Commonwealth v. Highland, 875 A.2d 1175 (Pa. Super. 2005) (definition of abuse of discretion in sentencing)
- Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super. 2000) (discretionary‑aspect sentencing requirements and substantial‑question standard)
- Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2006) (four‑part test to reach merits of discretionary sentencing claim)
- Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617 (Pa. 2002) (requirement of Rule 2119(f) statement for sentencing challenges)
- Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. 2004) (content required in concise statement about sentencing guidelines)
- Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721 (Pa. Super. 2000) (interpretation of Rule 2119(f) requirements)
- Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280 (Pa. Super. 2010) (total confinement after revocation permissible where conduct suggests likelihood of committing another crime or to vindicate court authority)
- Flowers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 987 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (factfinder’s role in assessing witness credibility)