Com. v. Pulliam, S.
Com. v. Pulliam, S. No. 1704 WDA 2016
Pa. Super. Ct.Jul 11, 2017Background
- Appellant Stepfon Pulliam pled guilty to simple assault and sexual assault and was sentenced on August 15, 2014 to 72 to 144 months; the trial court also designated him a sexually violent predator (SVP).
- Pulliam did not file post‑sentence motions or a direct appeal; he filed a PCRA petition on March 20, 2015 and counsel filed a Turner/Finley no‑merit letter; the PCRA was denied and this Court affirmed on June 1, 2016 as to ineffective assistance and voluntariness of the plea.
- On July 26, 2016 Pulliam filed a motion seeking 77 days of pre‑sentence credit; while that motion was pending, he filed a new PCRA petition on August 19, 2016 invoking a timeliness exception based on later judicial decisions (citing Teague and an unpublished memorandum).
- The PCRA court consolidated the time‑credit motion with the new PCRA petition, issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, and dismissed the petition as untimely under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b); Pulliam appealed.
- On appeal Pulliam argued (1) the court erred by treating the time‑credit motion as a PCRA petition, (2) he was entitled to 77 days’ credit, and (3) the court erred by treating an SVP challenge as a second, untimely PCRA petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the PCRA court erred by consolidating Pulliam’s motion for time credit with his PCRA petition | Pulliam: motion for time credit is a non‑PCRA, collateral challenge and should not be subject to PCRA timeliness | Commonwealth/PCRA court: challenge to pre‑sentence credit implicates legality of sentence and is cognizable under PCRA | Court: consolidation was proper; time‑credit claim is subject to PCRA and its timeliness rules |
| Whether Pulliam is entitled to 77 days of credit for time served | Pulliam: trial court refused to award 77 days; he is entitled to that credit | Commonwealth: court lacked jurisdiction to reach merits because petition was untimely under PCRA | Court: dismissed claim as untimely; lacked jurisdiction to address the credit merits |
| Whether Pulliam’s SVP/status/registration challenge is cognizable outside the PCRA and thus not time‑barred | Pulliam: SVP challenge and registration issue fall outside PCRA and are not subject to its timeliness bar | Commonwealth: SVP challenges are cognizable under PCRA doctrine; in any event claim was waived for failure to raise on direct appeal | Court: issue waived for being raised first on appeal; even if considered, SVP challenge could have been raised earlier and is not available now |
| Whether the PCRA court abused discretion by treating alleged SVP defects as a second PCRA petition and dismissing as untimely | Pulliam: court should not treat SVP matters as a successive PCRA matter | Commonwealth: treatment was correct under PCRA framework | Court: no abuse of discretion; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. Commonwealth, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) (standards for counsel withdrawing via no‑merit letter in PCRA proceedings)
- Finley v. Commonwealth, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) (procedures for appellate counsel’s no‑merit submissions)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules)
- Chester v. [Commonwealth], 895 A.2d 520 (Pa. 2006) (PCRA time limits are jurisdictional)
- Lambert v. [Commonwealth], 884 A.2d 848 (Pa. 2005) (if PCRA petition untimely, courts lack jurisdiction)
- Masker v. [Commonwealth], 34 A.3d 841 (Pa. Super. 2011) (SVP classification challenges are not cognizable under PCRA)
- Fowler v. [Commonwealth], 930 A.2d 586 (Pa. Super. 2007) (challenge to failure to award pre‑sentence credit involves legality of sentence and is cognizable under the PCRA)