256 A.3d 1274
Pa. Super. Ct.2021Background
- Wayne Prater committed a multi‑incident course of conduct against his estranged girlfriend (harassing calls, smashing windows, repeated flooding of her home, and planting a pipe bomb); his fingerprint was found on a bag of fuses and his cell phone was used to call 911 about a bomb.
- He was convicted in six consolidated cases of multiple offenses including risking a catastrophe (18 Pa.C.S. § 3302) and sentenced in 2012 to an aggregate 35½–71 years, including 10–20 years for risking a catastrophe.
- Prater filed a PCRA petition arguing his 10–20 year sentence on the risking‑a‑catastrophe count was illegal (statutory max 7 years) and asserting multiple ineffective‑assistance‑of‑counsel (IAC) claims.
- At a 2020 PCRA hearing the court held the 10–20 year sentence illegal, resentenced the risking‑a‑catastrophe count to 3½–7 years but kept other sentences intact (new aggregate 29–58 years), denied the IAC claims, and denied motions to run the risk sentence concurrently.
- Prater appealed both the PCRA disposition (IAC rulings and grant of sentencing relief) and the new judgment of sentence; the Superior Court affirmed both orders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Prater) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of 10–20 year sentence for risking a catastrophe | 10–20 yrs illegal because risking a catastrophe is a 3rd‑degree felony with 7‑yr max | Original sentencing exceeded statutory maximum for that count | Held: original 10–20 yrs illegal; resentenced to 3½–7 yrs (statutory max) |
| Whether risk sentence should run concurrently | Prater: making the risk sentence concurrent would reduce aggregate to 25½–52 yrs and is appropriate | Commonwealth: trial court’s reasons for consecutive time justified; objected to concurrency | Held: court did not abuse discretion in ordering consecutive sentences given sentencing record and danger to victim |
| IAC for appellate counsel re: Rule 600 (speedy trial) | Prater: appellate counsel ineffective for not raising Rule 600 denial | Commonwealth: claim undeveloped; record does not identify delays or responsible parties | Held: IAC claim lacks arguable merit; rejected |
| IAC for failure to request a 'mere presence' jury instruction | Prater: jury should have been told mere presence insufficient to convict | Commonwealth: court adequately instructed elements; specific mere‑presence charge unnecessary | Held: no relief — jury was accurately instructed on elements; instruction not required |
| IAC for failing to call witnesses (Blanche/Frank Jones, Eric Bell, Leticia Washington) | Prater: uncalled witnesses/alibi would have refuted victim | Commonwealth: some testimony was stipulated; counsel strategically declined Bell; Washington’s affidavit vague and contradicted by other evidence | Held: PCRA court properly denied relief — no prejudice and some waivers/strategic decisions upheld |
| IAC for failing to suppress cell‑phone evidence without warrant | Prater: should have moved to suppress phone‑number evidence | Commonwealth: controlling law at trial did not require a warrant; later Supreme Court decisions changed law | Held: counsel not ineffective — Riley and related cases postdated trial/direct appeal; counsel judged by law at time of trial |
| IAC for not filing motion in limine to exclude ATF/fuse evidence | Prater: fuse evidence was confusing/misleading and should be excluded | Commonwealth: fuse evidence was relevant to access, identity, and scheme to build bombs | Held: evidence admissible and probative; no IAC relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (search of digital information on cell phones generally requires a warrant)
- Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475 (Pa. 2018) (applies Riley to warrantless cell‑phone access by police)
- Commonwealth v. Stem, 96 A.3d 407 (Pa. Super. 2014) (applies Riley to warrantless phone searches incident to arrest)
- Commonwealth v. McEnany, 667 A.2d 1143 (Pa. Super. 1995) (prior authority allowing limited cell‑data access under then‑existing law)
- Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111 (Pa. 2011) (standards for ineffective assistance and prejudice requirement)
- Commonwealth v. Bartrug, 732 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Super. 1999) (PCRA court may vacate entire sentencing scheme when an interdependent sentence is illegal)
- Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263 (Pa. Super. 2008) (sentencing court’s reasons for an above‑guidelines sentence may justify lengthy consecutive terms)
- Commonwealth v. La, 640 A.2d 1336 (Pa. Super. 1994) (mere‑presence instruction not required when jury adequately instructed on elements)