304 A.3d 1284
Pa. Super. Ct.2023Background
- On Feb. 9, 2022, Justin Powanda was involved in an earlier incident at A2Z Smoke Shop; the manager (Smith) contacted police and later told Powanda by phone he was not allowed to return that day.
- Powanda returned to the shop at about 6:45 p.m.; Smith testified he was yelling, intimidating, sweaty, and refused 5–10 commands to leave; she called 911 and directed a customer to another room.
- Powanda left before police arrived but later admitted to an officer he knew he could not be there and nevertheless returned.
- He was charged with defiant trespass (18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b)(1)(i)) and disorderly conduct; after the Commonwealth rested, defense moved for judgment of acquittal invoking the § 3503(c)(2) statutory defense (premises open to public; actor complied with lawful conditions).
- The trial court denied the motion; jury convicted on trespass and the court convicted on disorderly conduct; sentence: 12 months’ probation and a $10 fine; Powanda appealed arguing the § 3503(c)(2) defense should have barred the trespass conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Powanda's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3503(c)(2) defense precludes conviction when a person reenters a public business after having been previously told he was barred for earlier misconduct | The evidence showed Powanda was barred due to earlier misconduct, reentered knowing he was not licensed to be there, and refused repeated orders to leave; thus trespass elements proven | The store was open to the public and a prior ban based on earlier conduct is not a "lawful condition" under § 3503(c)(2); he was ordered out upon entry before new misconduct occurred, so the defense applies | The Superior Court rejected Powanda’s theory and affirmed: § 3503(c)(2) does not shield a person who reenters after having been barred for prior misconduct and then refuses to leave; evidence sufficed to show notice and mens rea |
| Whether Commonwealth proved the mens rea and notice elements of defiant trespass | Knowledge and refusal were established (including Powanda’s later admission: “Yeah, but I went anyway.”) | N/A (Powanda contested sufficiency implicated by the statutory defense) | The court held mens rea and notice were sufficiently established to support the conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. White, 492 A.2d 32 (Pa. Super. 1985) (explains § 3503(c)(2) purpose: to avoid criminalizing mere presence in a public place and notes owner may bar entry for prior breaches)
- Commonwealth v. Bradley, 232 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2020) (sets elements for defiant trespass under § 3503(b)(1)(i))
- Commonwealth v. Conyers, 357 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. 1976) (en banc) (defiant trespass occurs when one remains after notice of trespass is given)
- Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 A.3d 390 (Pa. Super. 2011) (defiant trespass requires knowledge of lack of license or privilege to be on property)
- Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super. 1982) (standard for ruling on motion for judgment of acquittal: view evidence in light most favorable to Commonwealth)