Com. v. Pedrick, A., 1574 EDA 2016

Appellant Ashley Pedrick sought recusal of the trial judge after the judge had previously made an adverse credibility determination against her in an earlier contempt proceeding that was later vacated.
The trial court denied Pedrick's recusal motion; she appealed the denial to the Superior Court.
On appeal Pedrick argued both actual bias/partiality and an appearance of partiality (appearance of impropriety) warranted recusal.
The Superior Court majority addressed only the claim of actual bias/partiality and found no merit; Judge Bowes concurred but wrote separately to address the appearance-of-partiality theory.
Judge Bowes explained Pennsylvania law recognizes that an appearance of partiality can require recusal, but Pedrick waived that argument by not presenting it below or in her concise statement.
Even assuming preservation, Judge Bowes concluded the prior adverse credibility finding alone did not create a reasonable appearance of partiality warranting recusal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a judge’s prior adverse credibility determination requires recusal for actual bias	Pedrick: prior adverse credibility finding shows bias and trial judge must recuse	Commonwealth/Trial court: no evidence of bias, rulings were proper and not disqualifying	Court: claim lacked merit; no actual bias shown
Whether an appearance of partiality (appearance of impropriety) requires recusal and is reviewable	Pedrick: appearance of partiality from prior credibility finding required recusal regardless of personal animus	Trial court/Commonwealth: argument not raised below; reviewability contested	Judge Bowes: appearance-of-partiality claims are reviewable but Pedrick waived it by failing to preserve below
Whether an adverse credibility determination alone creates an appearance of partiality sufficient for recusal	Pedrick: adverse credibility determination created reasonable question about impartiality	Commonwealth: adverse rulings alone do not establish disqualifying bias	Court: adverse credibility finding alone, without more, does not create appearance of partiality; would make recusal routine and is insufficient
Standard for evaluating appearance-of-impropriety recusal motions	Pedrick: (implicit) objective test should apply	Judge Bowes: adopts objective disinterested observer test (Pepsico/McMillen)	Court: objective test appropriate; would not mandate recusal on these facts

Goodheart v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1989) (appearance of partiality may require recusal)
In re McFall, 617 A.2d 707 (Pa. 1992) (appearance of impropriety alone can warrant new proceedings)
Joseph v. Scranton Times L.P., 987 A.2d 633 (Pa. 2009) (appearance of impropriety justifies new trial to preserve appearance of justice)
Reilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985) (judge's self-assessment of impartiality historically described as personal and not subject to review)
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51 (Pa. Super. 2014) (discussion of limits on review of recusal denials; language suggesting nonreviewability cited)
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79 (Pa. 1998) (adverse rulings alone do not establish bias warranting recusal)
Pepsico v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985) (objective disinterested-observer test for recusal appearance)