Com. v. Payne, R.
Com. v. Payne, R. No. 604 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Sep 7, 2017Background
- Raymond Dale Payne pled guilty to murder and later contested degree of guilt (first- vs. third-degree) at a 1977 degree-of-guilt hearing where the court found him guilty of first-degree murder.
- Prosecution’s theory at that hearing: Payne intentionally killed the victim during a sexual assault; key evidence was seminal fluid recovered from the victim and witness Anthony Lee Evans’s testimony that Payne confessed to strangling the victim while sexually assaulting her.
- The trial court credited Evans and relied on the presence of seminal fluid (found to contain seminal acid phosphatase) to infer an intentional killing and premised the first-degree finding on that inference.
- Decades later DNA testing conclusively excluded Payne as the contributor of the seminal fluid; Payne sought PCRA relief under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) as after-discovered, exculpatory evidence.
- The legal question became whether the newly available DNA evidence is exculpatory and, if so, whether it would likely have changed the outcome of the degree-of-guilt hearing; the dissenting judge (Moulton, J.) would reverse and remand for a new hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Payne) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held (Dissent) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DNA excluding Payne as contributor of seminal fluid is "exculpatory" and would likely have changed the degree-of-guilt outcome under § 9543(a)(2)(vi) | DNA undermines the prosecution’s sexual-assault-based inference of intent, casts doubt on Evans’s confession corroboration, and would likely shift verdict to a lesser degree | DNA is not exculpatory as it does not prove innocence of murder generally and would only exculpate him if he’d been convicted of a sexual offense | Dissent: DNA is exculpatory because it undercuts the central inference of intentional killing and, by a preponderance, would likely have changed the outcome; remand for a new degree-of-guilt hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Bonaccurso, 625 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 1993) (after-discovered evidence that makes a first-degree verdict less likely can be exculpatory and warrant a new trial)
- Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221 (Pa. 2016) (elements a petitioner must prove for after-discovered evidence under the PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Bulted, 279 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1971) (newly available corroboration of defendant’s account at trial can warrant a new trial when prosecution relied heavily on the absent witness)
- Commonwealth v. Fiore, 780 A.2d 704 (Pa. Super. 2001) (after-discovered testimony that directly contradicts the prosecution’s theory may likely change the verdict and supports relief)