Com. v. Payne, R.
Com. v. Payne, R. No. 604 WDA 2016
Pa. Super. Ct.Sep 7, 2017Background
- In 1977 Raymond Dale Payne pled guilty to murder generally; a non-jury degree-of-guilt hearing found him guilty of first‑degree murder for the 1975 strangulation death of 16‑year‑old Debra Gama and he received life imprisonment.
- Evidence at the hearing included Payne’s statement admitting he tied Gama and left her suspended, cellmate Anthony Evans’ jailhouse testimony that Payne raped and intentionally strangled her, and forensic proof of seminal acid phosphatase in the victim’s vaginal and anal swabs.
- Payne repeatedly sought post-conviction DNA testing for the seminal material; prior PCRA courts and this Court denied relief, concluding identity of the semen donor was not dispositive of the first‑degree murder verdict.
- In federal court (W.D. Pa.) Payne obtained court‑ordered DNA testing in 2014; results conclusively excluded Payne as a contributor to the semen found in the victim.
- Payne filed a PCRA petition (2015) arguing the now‑available DNA was newly discovered exculpatory evidence that would have changed the degree‑of‑guilt outcome; the PCRA court denied relief and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Payne) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether post‑conviction DNA excluding Payne as semen donor is newly discovered exculpatory evidence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) that would likely change the degree‑of‑guilt verdict | DNA disproves a key inference the prosecution relied on to show intent (sexual assault nexus) and thus creates reasonable doubt as to first‑degree murder | Semen identity was not a critical factor; confession, cellmate testimony, manner of killing, and concealment established intent and guilt regardless of semen donor | Denied—DNA would not likely have changed the outcome; PCRA court order affirmed |
| Whether the DNA evidence is material or exculpatory such that it compels relief | Excluding Payne from semen is materially exculpatory and undermines Commonwealth’s narrative | Even if semen came from another male, it is neutral or potentially inculpatory (suggests another participant); it is not exculpatory as to first‑degree murder | DNA not material/exculpatory for murder conviction; court rejects claim though it notes PCRA court’s alternative reasoning was erroneous |
| Whether the PCRA court’s suggestion that DNA could indicate an accomplice created a new theory and was improper | PCRA court erred by considering hypotheses not in the record and by failing to address constitutional claims | PCRA court’s comment was unnecessary but harmless; substantive constitutional remand not warranted because outcome unchanged | Appellate court agrees remand unnecessary; constitutional claim denied |
| Whether remand required for the PCRA court to address unspecified constitutional claims arising from new DNA results | Payne says due process and fundamental fairness warrant reconsideration given new DNA | Commonwealth asserts constitutional protections were considered through PCRA standards and evidence remains sufficient | No remand; appellate court holds DNA does not establish innocence or require a new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Pruitt, 951 A.2d 307 (Pa. 2008) (specific intent to kill may be inferred from circumstances, including tying and leaving a victim bound)
- Commonwealth v. Keaton, 729 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1999) (tightening a ligature sufficient to permit finding of specific intent to kill)
- Commonwealth v. Fiore, 780 A.2d 704 (Pa. Super. 2001) (elements required to establish newly discovered evidence under § 9543(a)(2)(vi))
- Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114 (Pa. 2017) (specific intent and malice may be inferred from circumstantial evidence)