Com. v. Norton, M.
Com. v. Norton, M. No. 2359 EDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Mar 23, 2017Background
- Michael Norton was charged (2012) with multiple counts of indecent assault and corruption of minors for alleged sexual abuse of a child who visited his girlfriend’s mother; three indecent-assault counts were dismissed at preliminary hearing and an information was filed.
- The Commonwealth sought to admit prior-bad-acts evidence: Norton’s 1985–1990 abuse of his biological daughter in New York and a 1996 handwritten admission; the trial court denied Norton’s motion to preclude that evidence.
- Norton pleaded nolo contendere (Nov. 7, 2014) to one count of indecent assault and one count of corruption of minors under a negotiated 2–6 year aggregate sentence; SOAB evaluation followed and registration advisals were provided.
- Norton filed a counseled motion to withdraw his plea pre-sentencing (Mar. 23, 2015), asserting actual innocence and inability to live with a plea to crimes he did not commit; he did not participate in the SOAB evaluation.
- The trial court initially granted withdrawal (June 1, 2015) but, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, reconsidered and denied withdrawal (June 26, 2015); Norton was sentenced to the agreed term and appealed the denial of his presentence withdrawal motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a presentence claim of innocence, alone, can constitute a "fair and just reason" to withdraw a plea | Norton: His unequivocal assertion of innocence and challenge to complainant credibility make a colorable showing that withdrawal would promote fairness and justice | Commonwealth/Trial Ct.: Assertion of innocence alone is insufficient; delay between charge/plea and withdrawal, and no new evidence, undercut claim | Trial court denied withdrawal on reconsideration; dissent would have granted because Carrasquillo permits plausible innocence claims to suffice absent Commonwealth prejudice |
| Whether Carrasquillo changed the standard for presentence plea withdrawal so that innocence claims must be evaluated for plausibility | Norton: Carrasquillo requires courts to consider plausibility; a plausible innocence claim can by itself be fair and just | Commonwealth: Court applied Carrasquillo to reject withdrawal based on timing and lack of new evidence | Majority affirmed denial; dissent argued trial court misapplied Carrasquillo by not assessing plausibility of Norton’s innocence claim |
| Whether Norton’s delay in seeking withdrawal was evidence of gamesmanship or bad faith | Commonwealth: Long lapse between charge/plea and motion suggests opportunism; plea was knowingly entered after significant pretrial proceedings | Norton: Delay does not demonstrate bad faith or manipulation; no prejudice shown to Commonwealth | Trial court relied on delay as undermining withdrawal; dissent found no record of bad faith and noted Commonwealth did not claim prejudice |
| Whether the Commonwealth would be substantially prejudiced by permitting withdrawal | Norton: Commonwealth did not assert or prove any post-plea prejudice | Commonwealth: Implied prejudice from delay and disruption to proceedings | Trial court did not find formal Commonwealth prejudice in the record; majority nonetheless affirmed denial; the dissent emphasized Commonwealth failed to demonstrate prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1285 (Pa. 2015) (a presentence claim of innocence must be at least plausible and courts should assess whether allowing withdrawal would promote fairness and justice)
- Commonwealth v. Blango, 150 A.3d 45 (Pa. Super. 2016) (prejudice to the Commonwealth requires showing the Commonwealth is in a worse position due to events after the plea)
- Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124 (Pa. Super. 2009) (distinguishes liberal presentence withdrawal standard from the stricter post-sentence manifest-injustice standard)