Com. v. Nesmith, A., 1481 EDA 2015

Andrew Nesmith pleaded guilty to retail theft in Jan. 1998 and was sentenced Mar. 18, 1998 to 6–23 months; he was later released on parole and reparoled in Sept. 1999.
Lehigh County filed a petition to revoke parole on June 23, 2000 and issued a bench warrant; Nesmith was arrested Aug. 21, 2000, waived the preliminary (Gagnon I) hearing, and was released on bail.
A Gagnon II revocation hearing was scheduled for Sept. 12, 2000; Nesmith did not appear, a bench warrant issued, and a certified letter was delivered to his address on Sept. 14, 2000 signed by Gladys Nesmith.
Authorities did not take Nesmith into custody on the Lehigh bench warrant until Apr. 15, 2015; the Gagnon II hearing occurred May 12, 2015 — about fifteen years after the alleged violation.
At the 2015 hearing the Commonwealth presented a Lehigh parole officer who read (over hearsay objection) from an alleged May 17, 2000 Philadelphia parole officer’s letter; the Commonwealth did not introduce the letter or call the Philadelphia officer.
The trial court revoked parole and imposed remaining backtime; the Superior Court reversed, holding the 15‑year delay was unreasonable, resulted from the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence, and prejudiced Nesmith (including violation of confrontation rights).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth)	Defendant's Argument (Nesmith)	Held
1. Speedy revocation hearing — was 15‑year delay permissible?	Delay was reasonable because Nesmith concealed his whereabouts and notice was sent in 2000.	15‑year delay was unreasonable; Commonwealth failed to act with diligence and Nesmith was prejudiced.	Reversed: 15‑year delay unreasonable; Commonwealth lacked due diligence and delay prejudiced Nesmith.
2. Proof of proper notice to original Gagnon II hearing	Commonwealth relied on file copies of letters showing notice was mailed Aug. 29, 2000.	Commonwealth failed to introduce the letters; evidence shows another person signed for certified mailing.	Held for Nesmith: Commonwealth failed to prove proper service of notice.
3. Admission of hearsay testimony (Lehigh officer reading Philadelphia officer’s letter)	Testimony sufficed to establish violation.	Testimony was inadmissible hearsay and not authenticated; violated right to confront adverse witness.	Held for Nesmith: Letter testimony was inadmissible without good cause and deprived Nesmith of confrontation.
4. Sufficiency of evidence for violation (whereabouts unknown)	Evidence showed Nesmith failed to report March–mid‑May 2000.	Insufficient proof of willful concealment or notice of hearing; lack of live testimony from Philadelphia officer.	Held for Nesmith: Insufficient admissible evidence to support revocation given delay and evidentiary defects.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (establishes two‑stage parole revocation process and required due‑process protections)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (sets standards for parole revocation proceedings)
Allshouse v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 1236 (Pa. Super. 2009) (hearsay inadmissible at Gagnon II absent good cause for confrontation restriction)
Saunders v. Commonwealth, 575 A.2d 936 (Pa. Super. 1990) (rule that hearings must be held within a reasonable time under Rule 708)
McCain v. Commonwealth, 467 A.2d 382 (Pa. Super. 1983) (delay reasonableness and prejudice analysis)
Wright v. Commonwealth, 116 A.3d 133 (Pa. Super. 2015) (multi‑year delay in revocation held unreasonable; presumption of prejudice when probationary term expires)
Bischof v. Commonwealth, 616 A.2d 6 (Pa. Super. 1992) (examining diligence and measuring delay)
Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 761 A.2d 613 (Pa. Super. 2000) (describing Gagnon I/II distinctions and due‑process safeguards)
Kates v. Commonwealth, 305 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1973) (requirement that Commonwealth prove violation by probative evidence)