222 A.3d 16
Pa. Super. Ct.2019Background
- Appellant Lee Andrew Moore was convicted in 2013 of multiple sexual offenses and originally sentenced to 9–25 years; his judgment of sentence was vacated on collateral review and he was resentenced in March 2018 to 5.5–17 years plus 12 years’ probation.
- At resentencing the court informed Moore SORNA II would require lifetime registration and the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) would publish registrant information online under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.63.
- Moore filed a post‑sentence motion arguing retroactive application of the Internet‑dissemination provision (Section 9799.63) violates the federal Ex Post Facto Clause; the trial court denied relief and Moore appealed.
- The Superior Court applied the Smith v. Doe two‑step test and the Mendoza‑Martinez factors, and treated Commonwealth v. Muniz as controlling on the effect of Internet publication.
- The Court held that although the legislature’s stated intent was remedial/public‑safety, the Internet dissemination mandated by § 9799.63 is punitive in effect (analogous to public shaming, imposes an affirmative disability, and is excessive relative to the stated purpose).
- Remedy: the Court affirmed Moore’s judgment of sentence but declared § 9799.63 unconstitutional as applied retroactively, found the provision severable, and ordered Moore’s entry removed from the PSP Megan’s Law website.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 9799.63 (PSP Internet publication of registrant data) is punitive when applied retroactively in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause | Moore: Internet publication functions as public shaming, injures reputation, and is excessive — thus punitive in effect and retroactive application is unconstitutional | Commonwealth/Intervenor: Legislature intended a civil, public‑safety scheme; Internet dissemination is remedial and required for public protection (and federal compliance) | Held: § 9799.63 is punitive in effect (Muniz controlling) and its retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; removal ordered |
| Whether the Internet publication provisions are severable from SORNA II | Moore: Internet provision should be excised, leaving the remainder intact | Commonwealth: (implicitly) the statute should stand as enacted; Intervenor emphasized federal obligations but did not rebut severability | Held: Internet publication provisions are severable; remainder of SORNA II remains enforceable |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (held SORNA I’s publication/registration provisions were punitive in effect; analogized Internet dissemination to public shaming)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (established two‑step Ex Post Facto inquiry: legislative intent and, if remedial, whether effects are punitive)
- Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003) (applied Mendoza‑Martinez factors to sex‑offender laws and discussed public‑notice limitations under Megan’s Law)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (articulated factors to determine whether a civil sanction is punitive)
