Com. v. Monroe, E.
Com. v. Monroe, E. No. 1523 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Apr 19, 2017Background
- Edward Layman Monroe was convicted by jury in 1997 of first-degree murder, retaliation against a witness, and conspiracy and sentenced to life imprisonment. His direct appeals were exhausted by 1999.
- Monroe filed a timely first PCRA in 2000 which was denied and that denial was affirmed on appeal in 2001.
- On March 24, 2016, Monroe submitted a pro se filing seeking resentencing/relief; the trial court treated it as a second PCRA petition and found it untimely.
- Monroe argued his petition fit the PCRA’s newly-recognized constitutional-right exception, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Alleyne and Montgomery, and sought to qualify under the 60-day filing rule for newly recognized rights.
- The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the petition was filed well after the one-year PCRA deadline and Monroe did not establish any timeliness exception.
- The Superior Court affirmed: Montgomery (juvenile LWOP retroactivity) did not help Monroe (he was an adult when he committed the offense); Alleyne was not timely asserted and has not been held retroactive for collateral review in Pennsylvania.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the pro se filing should be analyzed as a PCRA petition and is timely | Monroe urged relief and claimed exceptions based on new constitutional decisions | Commonwealth argued the filing asserts PCRA claims and is a second, untimely PCRA petition | Court held the filing is a PCRA petition (second PCRA) and is untimely under §9545(b)(1) |
| Whether Montgomery creates a timeliness exception for Monroe | Monroe invoked Montgomery (retroactivity of Miller) as a newly recognized constitutional right within 60 days | Commonwealth argued Montgomery concerns juvenile LWOP and is inapplicable because Monroe was an adult at offense | Court held Montgomery inapplicable because Montgomery/Miller only concern juvenile offenders; Monroe was not a juvenile |
| Whether Alleyne constitutes a new constitutional right that applies retroactively to Monroe’s collateral petition | Monroe invoked Alleyne (sentencing facts must be found beyond reasonable doubt) as newly recognized right under §9545(b)(1)(iii) | Commonwealth argued Alleyne was decided in 2013 and Monroe filed in 2016 (beyond 60 days) and Pennsylvania courts have not made Alleyne retroactive on collateral review | Court held Monroe failed the 60-day requirement and Alleyne has not been held retroactive for collateral review in Pennsylvania |
| Whether an illegal sentencing claim avoids PCRA time bars | Monroe asserted illegality of sentence which he implies is not time-barred | Commonwealth relied on precedent that illegal sentencing claims remain subject to PCRA time limits unless an exception applies | Court held illegality claims are cognizable under PCRA but still subject to the PCRA time limits or an applicable exception |
Key Cases Cited
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (facts increasing mandatory minimum must be found by jury beyond reasonable doubt)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller rule given retroactive effect on collateral review for juvenile LWOP)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life-without-parole for juvenile homicide unconstitutional)
- Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (legality-of-sentence claims remain subject to PCRA time limits)
- Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2016) (Alleyne not retroactive to cases on collateral review where judgment was already final)
- Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714 (Pa. 2008) (petitioner bears burden to plead and prove a timeliness exception)
- Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2013) (PCRA is sole vehicle for collateral relief; filing deadlines are jurisdictional)
- Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011) (legality-of-sentence claims fall under the PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Secreti, 134 A.3d 77 (Pa. Super. 2016) (60-day rule runs from date of germane decision when invoking §9545(b)(1)(iii))
- Commonwealth v. Patterson, 931 A.2d 710 (Pa. Super. 2007) (prisoner mailbox rule for filing dates)
