Com. v. Mims Carter, D.
1270 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 23, 2017Background
- At 2:30 a.m. on Oct. 29, 2013, police stopped a Pontiac for a turn-signal violation; appellant Devon Mims Carter was a front-seat passenger. A backup officer responded.
- Officer Alfer observed Carter reach toward his right-side pocket and instructed occupants to keep hands visible; Carter initially complied but then again reached down and appeared nervous and breathing heavily.
- Officers asked both occupants to exit the vehicle because Alfer feared Carter might have a firearm; Carter was patted down by Officer Easter, struggled when Easter approached his right pocket, and was tased and handcuffed.
- A search incident to arrest produced a bag with multiple heroin packets; Carter was charged and convicted after a stipulated non-jury trial of PWID, possession, paraphernalia, and resisting arrest.
- Carter’s suppression motion was denied; he appealed, lost, then filed a PCRA petition arguing trial counsel was ineffective for waiving a suppression argument that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a second detention after the traffic stop concluded.
- The PCRA court dismissed the petition; the Superior Court affirmed, holding the stop had not concluded when officers asked occupants out and that a Terry frisk was supported by the totality of circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a post‑stop investigatory detention | Carter: the traffic stop had ended before occupants were ordered out, so any subsequent detention required new reasonable suspicion which was lacking | Commonwealth: tasks tied to the stop were not completed and officers reasonably retained authority; frisk supported by officer safety concerns | The stop had not concluded; officers retained seizure authority and Terry frisk was justified |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not raising the "second seizure" suppression claim | Carter: counsel waived a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim, satisfying PCRA prejudice and arguable merit prongs | Commonwealth: underlying claim lacked merit because the stop had not ended, so counsel’s waiver was not unreasonable or prejudicial | Counsel not ineffective because the underlying suppression claim lacked arguable merit |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (U.S. 2015) (authority for traffic stop ends when tasks tied to infraction are completed)
- Commonwealth v. Palmer, 145 A.3d 170 (Pa. Super. 2016) (officer may order occupants out during stop but right ends when stop concludes)
- Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Super. 2002) (no bright-line rule when traffic stop becomes a new interaction)
- Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244 (Pa. 2011) (presumption that counsel is effective in PCRA ineffective-assistance analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294 (Pa. 2014) (PCRA standard: arguable merit, reasonable basis, actual prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125 (Pa. 2009) (defendant bears the burden to prove ineffectiveness)
- Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177 (Pa. Super. 2012) (standard of review for PCRA dismissal)
- Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238 (Pa. Super. 2011) (scope of review limited to record and PCRA findings)
- Commonwealth v. Gray, 896 A.2d 601 (Pa. Super. 2006) (Terry frisk justified where officer has reasonable belief suspect is armed; totality of circumstances governs)
- Commonwealth v. Wilson, 927 A.2d 279 (Pa. Super. 2007) (nervous movements toward pocket support Terry frisk)