Com. v. Miller, D., 465 MDA 2016

Background

On July 9, 2015, Dustin Miller entered a home and stole seventeen firearms and two chainsaws.
Miller pled guilty on October 6, 2015 to burglary (18 Pa.C.S. §3502(a)(2)) and theft by unlawful taking (18 Pa.C.S. §3921(a)); sentencing consolidated with a separate theft count at a different docket.
On November 10, 2015, the court imposed consecutive sentences: burglary 9–48 months and theft 12–48 months; Miller filed post-sentence motions and timely appealed.
Miller argued the burglary and theft convictions should merge for sentencing under the double jeopardy merger doctrine.
The trial court and appellate court applied statutory merger rules (42 Pa.C.S. §9765 and 18 Pa.C.S. §3502(d)) to decide whether the offenses merge.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether merger for sentencing is governed solely by statutes or by constitutional double jeopardy analysis	Commonwealth: statutes control merger; sentencing based on statutory test	Miller: merger doctrine is constitutional (double jeopardy) and requires elements + factual analysis; statutes cannot displace that	The court held statutory test governs; Miller's crimes do not merge under statutes
Whether burglary and the intended theft merge when theft was the offense intended inside the burglary	Commonwealth: burglary requires entry with intent; theft requires separate element (control of property); thus distinct elements	Miller: theft was the intended offense of the burglary and arose from single criminal act, so sentences should merge	Held that each offense contains at least one element the other does not, so no merger under §9765
Whether 18 Pa.C.S. §3502(d) bars separate sentences when the intended offense is a felony of first or second degree	Commonwealth: §3502(d) only forbids separate sentencing unless the intended offense is first- or second-degree felony; here theft was second-degree felony so statute allows separate sentencing	Miller: argued §3502(d) and §9765 shouldn't be interpreted to bar constitutional merger analysis	Held §3502(d) does not bar separate sentences here because theft qualified as second-degree felony, so no merger
Separation-of-powers / constitutionality challenge to §9765 and §3502(d)	Miller: statutes usurp judicial role to interpret Pa. Const. Art. I, §10 and are therefore unconstitutional	Commonwealth: legislature may define crimes and punishments; statutes do not violate double jeopardy or separation of powers	Held statutes are constitutional; prior precedent rejects Miller's separation-of-powers/double jeopardy challenge

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830 (Pa. 2009) (upholds §9765 elements test for merger; legislature may prescribe merger rules)
Commonwealth v. Wade, 33 A.3d 108 (Pa. Super. 2011) (rejects claim that §9765 violates Pennsylvania double jeopardy clause)
Commonwealth v. Quintua, 56 A.3d 399 (Pa. Super. 2012) (standard of review for illegal sentence and merger issues)