Com. v. Marshall, R.
1014 MDA 2017
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Dec 18, 2017Background
- On July 30, 2015, one‑year‑old Victim was left at home with Appellant Rashon Marshall; between 8:15 a.m. (mother left) and 8:43 a.m. (EMS arrival) Victim became unresponsive and was rushed to hospital.
- Medical experts at Children’s Hospital diagnosed multiple severe injuries (ligament injuries, broken artery in the neck, bruised spleen and chest, lacerated liver) and opined injuries were non‑accidental trauma, not explained by a fall or medical treatment.
- Appellant initially told police Victim slumped over on the couch, later admitted he tapped Victim on the stomach three times and offered other speculative explanations; no independent witnesses corroborated his account.
- Appellant was convicted at a bench trial of aggravated assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(9)), endangering the welfare of a child (18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1)), simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person; acquitted of aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(1).
- Sentenced to 9–18 years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault (aggravated range) and 5 years’ probation for child endangerment (to run after incarceration); trial court imposed a special condition barring contact with persons under 18 except supervised contact with the daughter.
- Superior Court affirmed convictions and aggravated‑range sentence but vacated the trial court’s special "no contact"/supervised‑contact condition as exceeding the trial court’s authority over parole/conditions of incarceration.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Marshall's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — aggravated assault (§2702(a)(9)) | Circumstantial evidence (Victim alone with Appellant during injury window, appellant admitted tapping, medical opinion of non‑accidental trauma) proves Appellant caused serious bodily injury to a child under 13. | Evidence does not prove how injuries occurred or that Marshall caused them; tapping could not have produced severe injuries. | Affirmed — evidence sufficient; circumstantial proof allowed. |
| Sufficiency — endangering welfare of child (§4304(a)(1)) | Appellant had duty and was aware Victim could be harmed; his actions/inaction endangered the child. | Appellant did not knowingly intend to harm when he tapped Victim. | Affirmed — evidence sufficient to show knowing endangerment under statutory test. |
| Weight of the evidence | Trial court found Commonwealth expert credible and facts supported verdict; appellate court should defer to trial court credibility findings. | Verdict shocks conscience given appellant’s immediate calls for help, cooperation, and possible alternative timing of injuries. | Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion; verdict not against weight of evidence. |
| Legality of special sentencing condition (no contact with minors except supervised contact with daughter) | (Commonwealth conceded) condition was beyond trial court authority when imposed on a sentence that triggers PBPP parole. | Condition validly protects victim and public. | Vacated — trial court lacked statutory authority to impose parole/contact conditions for sentences with maximum ≥2 years; such conditions are PBPP’s domain. |
| Discretionary‑aspects — aggravated‑range sentence (failure to state reasons/consider §9721(b)) | Trial court considered PSI, guidelines, offense gravity, prior record, victim impact, and stated reasons on record supporting aggravated range. | Trial court failed to adequately state reasons or consider statutory factors for aggravated‑range sentence. | Affirmed — record as a whole and on‑the‑record remarks show meaningful consideration; no abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706 (Pa. 2014) (standards for sufficiency review; circumstantial evidence may sustain conviction)
- Commonwealth v. Mears, 972 A.2d 1210 (Pa. Super. 2009) (trial court lacks authority to impose parole conditions when PBPP controls parole for sentences with maximum ≥ two years)
- Commonwealth v. Camps, 772 A.2d 70 (Pa. Super. 2001) (PBPP has exclusive authority over parole when maximum sentence is two years or more)
- Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011) (vacating trial court’s post‑release "no contact" restriction where parole is PBPP’s authority)
- Commonwealth v. Bryant, 57 A.3d 191 (Pa. Super. 2012) (three‑part test for endangering the welfare of a child)