Com. v. Manning, E.
2003 MDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Nov 29, 2016Background
- Eugene Manning, after treatment by physician’s assistant Pamela Ross, sent repeated letters, gifts, voicemail messages, and later text messages that caused Ross to fear for her and her family’s safety.
- Charges across three consolidated dockets: initial stalking (2011), additional stalking (2012), and 28 counts of harassment by anonymous communication (2012). Jury convicted Manning on all counts; sentence 72 to 144 months imprisonment.
- Procedural complexity over Manning’s representation: he had court-appointed counsel, obtained and fired private counsel, executed a written Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 waiver on 12/19/2011, proceeded pro se at trial, and later sought counsel again; multiple post-trial Grazier hearings occurred.
- Manning appealed pro se but failed to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, resulting in dismissal and later reinstatement of direct-appeal rights after a PCRA proceeding.
- On appeal, Manning argued (1) trial court failed to conduct an on-the-record waiver-of-counsel colloquy at trial and thus denied his right to counsel, and (2) the stalking and harassment statutes are unconstitutionally vague/overbroad.
- The Superior Court affirmed conviction and sentence, finding waiver/forfeiture law and prior colloquy/transcript/record issues dispositive and rejecting constitutional challenges as waived or meritless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Manning) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to conduct Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 colloquy at trial required new trial | Trial court satisfied waiver requirements because an on-the-record Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 colloquy had been conducted earlier (12/19/2011); court need not repeat colloquy absent necessity | Manning: trial court failed to conduct required on-the-record waiver colloquy when counsel withdrew at trial, so his waiver was not knowing/voluntary and he was denied right to counsel | No new trial. Earlier compliant colloquy and record (and/or forfeiture based on obstructive conduct) cure the defect; Lucarelli forfeiture principles apply |
| Constitutionality of stalking statute (vagueness/overbreadth/First Amendment) | Statute is constitutional and was properly applied; Manning had notice and prior warnings to stop contacting victim | Manning contended statute is facially and as-applied vague/overbroad, infringing speech and privacy rights | Rejected. Manning’s briefing was indecipherable/waived; prior precedent upholds statutes and facts show notice and repeated disobedience |
| Constitutionality of harassment-by-anonymous-communication statute | Harassment statute is constitutional and applicable to the texts/messages and anonymous communications presented | Manning claimed harassment statute vague/overbroad and criminalized protected or noncriminal conduct | Rejected as waived/meritless; statute previously upheld by Pennsylvania courts |
| Adequacy of appellate record/transcripts and responsibility to preserve record | Commonwealth: record and docket reflect written waiver; appellant had opportunity to order transcripts but failed to ensure complete record | Manning argued lack of transcript prevented review and concealed absence of colloquy | Held against Manning: appellant bears responsibility to secure transcripts; docket and other transcripts support existence of prior colloquy |
Key Cases Cited
- Davido v. Commonwealth, 868 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2005) (trial court must sua sponte ensure valid waiver-of-counsel colloquy)
- Grazier v. Commonwealth, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (on-the-record determination required that post-conviction/appellate waiver of counsel be knowing and voluntary)
- Lucarelli v. Commonwealth, 971 A.2d 1173 (Pa. 2009) (distinguishes waiver from forfeiture; disruptive/extremely dilatory conduct can amount to forfeiture obviating colloquy)
- Preston v. Commonwealth, 904 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2006) (appellant bears responsibility to ensure the record on appeal is complete)
- Schierscher v. Commonwealth, 668 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stalking and harassment statutes not unconstitutionally vague and not violative of free speech)