Com. v. Lentz, R.
901 MDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 21, 2016Background
- Appellant Rebecca Lynn Lentz was stopped while in the driver’s seat of a car parked on the berm with engine running, lights on, hands on the wheel and stating she was ready to resume driving home after drinking.
- Trooper McDermott intervened before Lentz put the vehicle in motion and arrested her for DUI under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802.
- The legal question centered on whether being in actual physical control or operating a vehicle for DUI conviction requires the vehicle to have been in motion.
- The majority reversed (implied) but Judge Stevens dissented, arguing precedent supports conviction when a driver assumes control even if the vehicle never moved.
- The dissent emphasizes legislative intent to protect public safety and interprets “drive, operate, or be in control” as covering actual physical control of vehicle machinery without motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “operate”/"actual physical control" for DUI requires the vehicle to be in motion | Commonwealth: evidence of control while parked with engine on and intent to drive suffices for DUI | Lentz: vehicle was not in motion; she was not driving and case is akin to sleeping-it-off precedents | Dissent: operation can be shown by actual physical control of machinery without motion; would affirm conviction |
| Relevance of defendant’s intent to drive | Commonwealth: intent not strictly necessary; control or operation is the legal focus | Lentz: lack of motion and passive conduct undermine intent to drive | Dissent: stated intent to resume driving supports finding of operation/actual control |
| Application of public safety purpose to pre-motion conduct | Commonwealth: statute protects public by criminalizing control/operation even before movement | Lentz: requires proof of movement for public-safety threshold | Dissent: statutory scheme contemplates risk before movement; officer need not wait for motion |
| Whether precedent (Byers line) controls when driver is asleep or merely seated | Commonwealth: distinguishes Byers where defendant was asleep and not intending to drive | Lentz: relies on Byers-style sleeping-it-off cases to argue no operation | Dissent: distinguishes Byers and cites cases finding control when engine on, driver positioned, and intent present |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Elliott, 50 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2012) (statutory construction presumes legislature did not enact meaningless terms)
- Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 A.2d 260 (Pa. Super. 2003) ("operate" requires actual physical control of machinery or management of movement, not motion)
- Commonwealth v. James, 863 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (operation may be shown without vehicle movement when actual physical control exists)
- Commonwealth v. Grimes, 648 A.2d 538 (Pa. Super. 1994) (conviction upheld where defendant revved engine while parked; actual physical control found)
- Commonwealth v. Byers, 650 A.2d 468 (Pa. Super. 1994) (sleeping-in-vehicle cases where lack of intent to drive distinguishes operation)
- Commonwealth v. Crum, 523 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. 1987) (public safety focus; motion not required to convict for control)
- Commonwealth v. Bobotas, 588 A.2d 518 (Pa. Super. 1991) (actual physical control can concern machinery control without full vehicle motion)
- Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242 (Pa. Super. 2010) (intent to drive distinguishes cases from sleeping-it-off precedents)