Com. v. Kraidman, B.
Com. v. Kraidman, B. No. 713 EDA 2016
Pa. Super. Ct.Apr 18, 2017Background
- Appellant Brian Kraidman was general manager of Krapf Coaches’ Rover division, which collected pre-set fares subsidized by PennDOT; drivers logged fares and placed cash/checks and reconciliation slips into secured drop safes.
- As general manager, Kraidman had exclusive access to fare reconciliations and stored sorted cash in his office; an auditor later found approximately $78,000 in missing deposits for the Rover program.
- Between April 2013 and September 2014, Kraidman’s ex-wife maintained a spreadsheet showing over $120,000 in cash deposits into their joint account; Krapf’s records and Kraidman’s reported salary did not account for that amount.
- Kraidman was convicted after a jury trial of theft by unlawful taking, theft by deception, and receiving stolen property; he was sentenced to 11.5–23 months’ incarceration plus eight years’ probation.
- On appeal, Kraidman raised (1) sufficiency of the evidence (challenging circumstantial proof and others’ access to funds) and (2) denial of due process by limiting cross-examination of his ex-wife about bank reporting and tax reporting of large cash deposits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Kraidman) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence for theft and receiving stolen property | Evidence (reconciliations, missing deposits, cash flow, ex-wife’s spreadsheet) proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt | Circumstantial proof insufficient; others had access to funds; 1925(b) statement preserved the claim | Waived for appeal: 1925(b) statement was boilerplate and failed to specify elements; claim not considered on merits |
| Exclusion of cross-examination re: bank reporting/tax reporting by ex-wife | Questions were irrelevant and would be marginally probative; trial court properly limited scope | Cross-examining about failure to file bank or tax forms would impeach credibility/bias and was constitutionally protected | No abuse of discretion: limitation was reasonable, not prejudicial under Van Arsdall; impeachment opportunities existed via other testimony |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231 (Pa. Super. 2015) (clarifies Rule 1925(b) specificity for sufficiency claims)
- Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254 (Pa. Super. 2015) (1925(b) boilerplate statements result in waiver)
- Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252 (Pa. Super. 2008) (1925(b) specificity requirement explained)
- Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618 (Pa. 2010) (Confrontation Clause and cross-examination principles)
- Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077 (Pa. Super. 2016) (limits on cross-examination; Van Arsdall framework applied)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1986) (two-step inquiry for confrontation-clause exclusion error)
- Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (U.S. 1985) (Confrontation Clause guarantees opportunity for effective cross-examination, not unlimited scope)
- Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291 (Pa. 2011) (trial court discretion over scope of cross-examination)
- Commonwealth v. McGowan, 635 A.2d 113 (Pa. 1993) (relevance requirement for admission of evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Lobel, 440 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. 1982) (limits on cross-examiner to matters relevant or showing bias)
