Com. v. Jones, M.
766 WDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 26, 2016Background
- Marcus Jones pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver (PWID), criminal use of a communication facility, and simple assault after police traced text messages and found heroin stamp bags labeled “new arrival” (gold eagle emblem) and $708 on Jones following a controlled contact at a Motel 6 where a user later died of an apparent overdose.\
- The guilty plea included a written and oral colloquy in which Jones acknowledged understanding the charges, maximum penalties, that sentences could be consecutive, and that he was satisfied with counsel.\
- At sentencing the court relied on a presentence investigation (PSI) and victim-impact evidence; the court described Jones as a drug dealer responsible for the victim’s death and imposed an aggregate sentence of 2½ to 5 years plus five years’ probation.\
- Jones filed post-sentence motions and sought to withdraw his plea, arguing it was not knowing/voluntary because counsel failed to advise him that (a) the factual basis would link him to the overdose death, (b) of his right to move to suppress the stop/arrest, and (c) of the true maximum exposure.\
- Jones also argued the sentence was excessive and exceeded the aggravated guideline range because the court improperly relied on an unsupported finding that he caused the user’s death. The court denied relief and the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jones) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / Trial Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plea involuntary because counsel ineffective for not advising that factual basis would tie Jones to overdose death | Counsel failed to warn that factual summary would state Jones was source of fatal drugs; would not have pled if aware | Affidavit/complaint contained death-related facts; plea colloquy showed Jones knew factual basis; ineffective-assistance claims belong in collateral review | Plea was knowing and voluntary; trial court did not abuse discretion; ineffective-assistance claims deferred to collateral review |
| Whether plea involuntary because counsel failed to advise of right to file suppression motion re motel parking‑lot stop | Counsel did not advise of suppression strategy; would have filed motion and possibly avoided plea | Claim alleges ineffective assistance; suppression-related ineffectiveness must be raised collaterally | Denied as a basis to withdraw plea; ineffectiveness claim not decided on direct appeal |
| Whether plea involuntary because Jones misunderstood maximum possible sentence / believed in a range plea agreement | Jones believed plea would result in 6–14 months within standard range; counsel failed to explain maximum exposure | Written and oral colloquies show Jones acknowledged understanding maximum penalties and sentencing discretion | Court found plea voluntary; plea colloquy statements binding; no manifest injustice shown |
| Whether sentence was excessive because court relied on unsupported finding that Jones caused Brinkley’s death and exceeded aggravated guideline range | Sentence beyond aggravated guideline (20 months) based on alleged responsibility for overdose unsupported by competent evidence; improper factor | Sentencing court considered PSI, victim impact, and evidence described at plea; court may weigh uncharged/uncharged-but-proved conduct in sentencing; no abuse of discretion | Sentence affirmed; appellate review found no manifest unreasonableness or reliance on improper factor sufficient to reverse |
Key Cases Cited
- Vance v. Commonwealth, 546 A.2d 632 (Pa. Super. 1988) (standard for withdrawing guilty plea after sentence requires showing prejudice causing manifest injustice)
- Miller v. Commonwealth, 748 A.2d 733 (Pa. Super. 2000) (appellate review of denial of motion to withdraw plea is for abuse of discretion)
- Grant v. Commonwealth, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) (ineffective-assistance claims generally reserved for collateral review)
- Stork v. Commonwealth, 737 A.2d 789 (Pa. Super. 1999) (defendant bound by statements in plea colloquy)
- Moury v. Commonwealth, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010) (standard of review for sentencing is abuse of discretion; four‑part test for discretionary‑aspects challenges)
- Sierra v. Commonwealth, 752 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super. 2000) (procedural requirements for appellate review of discretionary sentencing)
- Devers v. Commonwealth, 546 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1988) (when court has PSI, it is presumed to have considered relevant character information)
- Tirado v. Commonwealth, 870 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 2005) (same presumption regarding PSI usage at sentencing)
- Downing v. Commonwealth, 990 A.2d 778 (Pa. Super. 2010) (reliance on an improper sentencing factor raises a substantial question)