Com. v. Jones, B., 87 WDA 2016

In 2001 Brad E. Jones shot and killed a friend after drinking and using drugs; a jury convicted him in 2002 of third-degree murder and related offenses and he received an aggregate 21.5–43 year sentence.
Jones’s direct appeal was dismissed in April 2003 for failure to file a brief; his judgment of sentence became final on June 22, 2003.
Over the years Jones filed multiple PCRA petitions. On October 16, 2015 he filed a pro se “Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad-Subjiciendum” challenging the continued validity of his sentence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712 as violating due process and equal protection.
The trial court treated the filing as Jones’s fifth PCRA petition, issued a Rule 907 intent-to-dismiss notice, and concluded the petition was an untimely, serial PCRA petition not saved by any exception to the one‑year time bar.
Jones conceded in his response that he was not challenging the discretionary aspect of his sentence and that his original sentence was lawful, but argued he was unlawfully detained because § 9712 was later declared unconstitutional.
The PCRA court dismissed the petition on December 10, 2015; Jones appealed pro se. The Superior Court affirmed, agreeing the petition was a time‑barred PCRA filing and that the habeas label did not evade the PCRA scheme.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Jones)	Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth/Trial Ct.)	Held
Whether the habeas petition should be treated as a PCRA petition	Jones argued his writ challenged the lawfulness of his detention based on § 9712 being declared unconstitutional and thus was a habeas matter, not PCRA	The court argued the PCRA is the exclusive vehicle for post‑conviction collateral attack; labeling a petition "habeas" cannot avoid PCRA time bars	The Superior Court held the petition was properly treated as a PCRA petition
Whether the petition was timely or fits a statutory exception	Jones did not identify or plead a specific timeliness exception; argued unique circumstances and later judicial development rendered his detention unlawful	The Commonwealth/trial court noted the judgment became final in 2003 and the petition (filed 2015) was facially untimely; no § 9545(b)(1) exception was pled or proven	The Court held the petition was untimely and no exception was established, so it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2013) (PCRA is the sole means for collateral post‑conviction relief)
Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493 (Pa. 2016) (PCRA subsumes habeas where PCRA could provide a remedy)
Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Alleyne‑type claims implicate legality of sentence and are cognizable under the PCRA)
Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54 (Pa. Super. 2015) (claims under Alleyne affect sentence legality and must be raised in a timely PCRA if available)
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011) (untimely PCRA petitions must be dismissed absent a proven statutory exception)
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013) (finding certain facts that increase mandatory minimums must be found by a jury)