Com. v. Jones, A.
Com. v. Jones, A. No. 3152 EDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jun 9, 2017Background
- Appellant filed a third PCRA petition in 2016 seeking enlargement of time to add claims that his sentence was illegal: (1) the Board of Probation and Parole miscalculated his maximum date, and (2) he was denied counsel at sentencing. He did not plead any statutory exception to the PCRA time bar.
- The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely on September 13, 2016, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because Appellant failed to assert a time‑bar exception.
- Appellant timely appealed and filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement raising only the same claims from his enlargement request; the PCRA court relied on its earlier rulings in its 1925(a) statement.
- Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final January 31, 2006; his 2016 petition was filed roughly nine and one‑half years later, well beyond the PCRA’s one‑year filing deadline.
- Appellant argued on appeal that courts sometimes reach successive collateral claims on miscarriage‑of‑justice grounds and that he was not given an opportunity to amend to plead a timeliness exception; the court found these arguments insufficient because he never pleaded an exception or sought to amend to add one.
- The Superior Court affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because Appellant failed to satisfy the PCRA’s timeliness/pleading requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing an untimely petition without allowing amendment to allege a time‑bar exception | Appellant contends he was not given an opportunity to prove an exception and sought leave to amend | Appellee: petitioner had the obligation to plead an exception initially or in response to Rule 907; he did not plead any exception when seeking leave to amend | Dismissal affirmed — petitioner must plead a statutory exception; failure to do so is jurisdictional and cannot be cured on appeal |
| Whether a miscarriage‑of‑justice claim permits review of an untimely successive petition | Appellant cites precedent where courts reached merits in successive petitions for miscarriage of justice | Commonwealth: miscarriage‑of‑justice review requires that the initial timeliness requirement be met; there is no standalone timeliness exception for miscarriage of justice | Court held miscarriage‑of‑justice argument inapplicable because timeliness requirement was not satisfied |
| Whether trial court had a duty to appoint counsel or obtain a valid waiver at sentencing | Appellant argues denial of counsel at sentencing violated due process and Rule 121 waiver requirements | Commonwealth: procedural posture — claim untimely and not pleaded; merits not reached | Claim not considered on merits due to untimeliness; dismissal stands |
| Whether a judge can modify a sentence six years after imposition | Appellant asks if unilateral modification after six years is permissible | Commonwealth: procedural default—untimely claim; no jurisdiction | Not addressed on the merits because of timeliness defect |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa. Super. 2016) (standard of review for PCRA dismissal and timeliness jurisdictional rule)
- Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649 (Pa. Super. 2013) (timeliness of PCRA petition is jurisdictional)
- Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (courts may review miscarriage‑of‑justice claims only if timeliness requirement is met)
- Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. 2007) (explaining limits on miscarriage‑of‑justice claims in successive petitions)
- Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. 2007) (petitioner must plead a statutory time‑bar exception; may seek amendment in response to Rule 907)