Com. v. Johnson, A.
1508 EDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 7, 2016Background
- Arthur Johnson was convicted in 1997 of third-degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime and sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 to 45 years.
- Johnson filed a timely first PCRA petition in 2001 raising ineffective-assistance claims; counsel filed an amended petition. The PCRA court denied relief and this Court affirmed; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in 2005.
- Johnson filed a second PCRA petition in 2005, which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely; he did not appeal that dismissal.
- Johnson filed a third PCRA petition in October 2014, which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely under the PCRA one-year time bar; Johnson appealed pro se.
- On appeal Johnson argued (1) ineffective assistance of prior counsel and (2) that his second and third petitions should be treated as extensions of his timely first petition (including an assertion that the PCRA court’s handling of the first petition constituted governmental interference).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of third PCRA petition | Johnson contends his third petition should be considered timely as an extension of his first petition | Commonwealth argues the petition is untimely under the PCRA one-year rule and no exception applies | Petition is untimely; court has no jurisdiction absent a statutory exception |
| Applicability of PCRA statutory exceptions | Johnson asserts governmental interference (court ignored pro se claims) excuses late filing | Commonwealth denies interference and argues exceptions not pleaded or proven | Exceptions not pleaded/proven; interference claim rejected |
| Ineffective assistance of prior counsel as a timeliness exception | Johnson relies on prior counsel’s ineffectiveness to excuse lateness | Commonwealth contends ineffectiveness is not a recognized statutory timeliness exception | Ineffectiveness does not satisfy PCRA exceptions; not a basis to excuse untimeliness |
| Extension theory (treating later petitions as extensions of an earlier timely petition) | Johnson urges that later petitions extend his first timely PCRA filing | Commonwealth cites Robinson rejecting equitable extension theories | Robinson bars extension theory; cannot circumvent statutory time-bar |
| Court’s consideration of counseled amended petition (claim of hybrid-representation interference) | Johnson claims PCRA court’s focus on counsel’s amended petition interfered with his pro se claims | Commonwealth cites no right to hybrid representation and precedent allowing courts to consider counseled filings only | Court finds no governmental interference; appropriate to consider counseled amended petition only |
Key Cases Cited
- Wojtaszek v. Commonwealth, 951 A.2d 1169 (Pa. Super. 2008) (standard of review for PCRA denials and scope of appellate review)
- Marshall v. Commonwealth, 947 A.2d 714 (Pa. 2008) (burden on petitioner to plead and prove a timeliness exception)
- Robinson v. Commonwealth, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003) (rejecting equitable "extension" theory to circumvent PCRA time-bar)
- Gamboa–Taylor v. Commonwealth, 753 A.2d 780 (Pa. 2000) (ineffectiveness of counsel generally does not satisfy PCRA timeliness exceptions)
- Ellis v. Commonwealth, 626 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1993) (no constitutional right to hybrid representation)
- Pursell v. Commonwealth, 724 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1999) (courts need not parse pro se filings when counsel represents a petitioner)