Com. v. Johns, T., Com. v. Johns, T. No. 1628 MDA 2016

In January 2009, then-16-year-old Tyler Dwayne Johns fatally stabbed Kenyon Wright-Carter after prior gang-related altercations and alleged ongoing threats between them.
Witnesses (Rivera and K.) testified Johns approached the victim’s car and stabbed the victim multiple times; victim did not appear to reach for a weapon in witnesses’ view.
Johns testified he feared the victim (prior shooting and assaults), believed the victim reached toward his waist on this occasion, and claimed he acted without intent to kill (self-defense or heat of passion).
A jury acquitted Johns of first-degree murder, convicted him of third-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 20–40 years. Direct appeals were denied.
Johns filed a timely PCRA petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to preserve an objection/admission regarding his girlfriend’s testimony about his remorse/prayer after the stabbing and (2) failing to object to a jury instruction stating malice and fear are not mutually exclusive.
The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing, denied relief, and the Superior Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Johns)	Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / Trial Court)	Held
1. Whether counsel was ineffective for not preserving admission of girlfriend Gonzalez’s testimony (that Johns cried and prayed upon learning of victim’s grave condition) as evidence of lack of malice/state of mind	Gonzalez’s testimony was relevant to show lack of malice/intent and was not hearsay; counsel failed to articulate relevance, waiving the issue on appeal	Testimony about remorse after the killing is not probative of defendant’s mental state at the time of the killing (malice); thus counsel was not ineffective for not pursuing a meritless claim	Denied — testimony was legally irrelevant to malice; no ineffectiveness shown
2. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s supplemental instruction that malice and fear are not mutually exclusive	The judge’s response to the jury’s question should have emphasized that fear can negate malice; counsel’s failure to object waived review and prejudiced Johns (could have supported voluntary manslaughter)	The jury charge, read as a whole, accurately and adequately instructed on malice, voluntary manslaughter, and imperfect self-defense; clarifying that mere fear alone negating malice would be incorrect	Denied — supplemental instruction was a correct statement of law and counsel not ineffective for failing to object

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014) (three-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test)
Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2011) (counsel presumed effective; burden on appellant)
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795 (Pa. 2014) (counsel not ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims)
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186 (Pa. 2013) (malice element for third-degree murder explained)
Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stabbing supports malice finding for third-degree murder)
Commonwealth v. Tillia, 518 A.2d 1246 (Pa. Super. 1986) (post-offense remorse irrelevant to guilt)
Commonwealth v. Davalos, 779 A.2d 1190 (Pa. Super. 2001) (trial court discretion in supplemental jury instructions)
Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. 2008) (jury charge must be viewed as a whole)
Commonwealth v. Leonberger, 932 A.2d 218 (Pa. Super. 2007) (trial court wide discretion in phrasing instructions)
Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108 (Pa. 2012) (accurate voluntary manslaughter instruction affirmed)
Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369 (Pa. Super. 1987) (history of fear/abuse relevant but does not obviate requirement that threat be imminent)