Com. v. Hudson-Greenly, J.S., 247 A.3d 21

Appellant Jodie S. Hudson‑Greenly and a co‑defendant were convicted after a five‑day jury trial of endangering the welfare of children, criminal conspiracy, and simple assault for repeatedly beating an 11‑year‑old over a weekend and subjecting her to prolonged punishment, deprivation, and humiliation.
Before trial, the Commonwealth moved to admit the child’s prior statements under the Tender Years exception and to have the child testify via contemporaneous alternative method (closed‑circuit TV) under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985; the trial court held a hearing and observed and questioned the child outside the courtroom.
The trial court found the child’s prior statements reliable and, based on testimony (including from the child’s adoptive mother) and the court’s observations of the child’s physical distress when discussing seeing Appellant, determined that testifying in Appellant’s presence would cause serious emotional distress substantially impairing communication; it ordered closed‑circuit testimony.
The child testified via closed circuit at trial; jury was instructed to evaluate that testimony the same as in‑court testimony. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate 2 to 5 years’ imprisonment; post‑sentence motion was denied and this appeal followed.
Appellant’s appellate brief focused on whether permitting contemporaneous alternative testimony violated her rights and was an abuse of discretion; other claims were deemed waived for inadequate briefing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the child to testify by contemporaneous alternative method under §5985	Commonwealth: the court properly found, from testimony and the judge’s in‑camera observations, that the child would suffer serious emotional distress that would substantially impair her ability to communicate	Hudson‑Greenly: evidence was insufficient; adoptive mother testified child was functioning, had no psychiatric care or medications, was working with a psychologist, and later testified in court — so alternative testimony was unnecessary and prejudicial	Affirmed: trial court’s §5985 determination was supported by testimony and the judge’s observations, was not manifestly unreasonable or biased, and Appellant showed no prejudice from the accommodation

Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380 (Pa. 2013) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings; discretionary admissibility must not be abused)
Commonwealth v. Torres–Kuilan, 156 A.3d 1229 (Pa. Super. 2017) (interpreting §5985 and evaluating Commonwealth’s proffer for alternative testimony)
Commonwealth v. Tyrrell, 177 A.3d 947 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting sparse precedent addressing §5985 and related review principles)
Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168 (Pa. Super. 2018) (recognizing legislative intent to protect child witnesses and rejecting requirement that child must ‘break down’ before alternative methods are allowed)
Commonwealth v. Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960 (Pa. Super. 2006) (appellate waiver rules for undeveloped claims and briefing deficiencies)
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111 (Pa. 2011) (presumption that juries follow court instructions)