Com. v. Hayes, D.
1919 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Nov 9, 2017Background
- In 2003, Davon Hayes confessed to participating in a robbery during which a store clerk, William Anderson, was shot and killed; Hayes was convicted after a bench trial of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy and sentenced to life plus a concurrent 5–10 year term.
- Hayes’s direct appeal and subsequent appeals addressing the voluntariness of his confession were unsuccessful; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal.
- Hayes filed multiple PCRA petitions: two earlier petitions were denied and those denials were affirmed on appeal.
- On October 7, 2016 Hayes filed a third (untimely) PCRA petition claiming newly discovered facts: statements by Darnell Clark and Richard Peterson (from transcripts of a co-conspirator’s trial) and an August 24, 2016 affidavit from Antoine Lester.
- The PCRA court dismissed the third petition as untimely under the one-year jurisdictional bar; the Superior Court affirmed, concluding Hayes failed to prove the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) newly-discovered-fact exception or to file within the 60-day discovery window.
Issues
| Issue | Hayes's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hayes’s third PCRA petition satisfies the newly-discovered-facts exception to the one-year time bar (42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)) | Hayes: Transcripts of co-defendant Herring’s proceedings revealed that witnesses (Clark, Peterson) did not implicate Hayes, and Lester’s affidavit corroborates that Clark exonerated Hayes — facts previously unknown and not discoverable with diligence | Commonwealth: Hayes knew or could have discovered these facts earlier through counsel, friends, or basic investigation; Lester was a known acquaintance and Clark’s lack of identification was known earlier | Denied — Hayes failed to show facts were unknown or that he exercised due diligence; exception not met |
| Whether Hayes filed within 60 days of discovering the alleged newly-discovered facts (Section 9545(b)(2)) | Hayes: Filed promptly after learning the facts / obtaining transcripts and affidavits | Commonwealth: Record shows Hayes knew of Clark’s exonerating statement by June 26, 2016 (per Miller affidavit) but did not file until October 7, 2016, beyond 60 days | Denied — Hayes did not file within 60 days of discovery |
| Whether Lester’s affidavit constitutes a newly-discovered fact separate from previously available information | Hayes: Lester’s affidavit identifies that Clark said Hayes was not involved; Lester was previously unknown | Commonwealth: Lester was a friend of Hayes and known from October 9, 2003; Hayes offers no explanation for failure to locate him earlier | Denied — Lester’s affidavit does not qualify as newly discovered under § 9545(b)(1)(ii) |
| Whether Herring’s trial transcripts create newly-discovered facts that could not have been obtained with due diligence | Hayes: Transcripts revealed testimony favorable to Hayes | Commonwealth: Hayes and/or counsel could have learned of Herring’s trial and obtained transcripts earlier (Hayes had prior counsel and access to legal research) | Denied — Hayes failed to plead due diligence and thus transcripts do not meet the exception |
Key Cases Cited
- Spotz v. Commonwealth, 84 A.3d 294 (Pa. 2014) (standard of review for PCRA factual and legal determinations)
- Chester v. Miller, 895 A.2d 520 (Pa. 2006) (PCRA timeliness is jurisdictional)
- Breakiron v. Horn, 781 A.2d 94 (Pa. 2001) (due diligence requires petitioner to explain inability to learn facts earlier)
- Marshall v. Commonwealth, 947 A.2d 714 (Pa. 2008) (focus on newly discovered facts, not newly willing source; discovery date controls 60-day rule)
- Burton v. Commonwealth, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017) (elements of § 9545(b)(1)(ii))
- Stokes v. Commonwealth, 959 A.2d 306 (Pa. 2008) (timeliness separate from merits)
- Carr v. Commonwealth, 768 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Super. 2001) (due diligence requires reasonable steps to protect petitioner’s interests)
- Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 79 A.3d 649 (Pa. Super. 2013) (60-day filing requirement under § 9545(b)(2))
