Com. v. Gholson, B., 3665 EDA 2016

On April 28, 2015, Gholson drove through a red light, struck two vehicles, failed to stop, later drove by the scene, and led police on a >7-minute pursuit that included passing pedestrians, running red lights/stop signs, and speeding through a school zone.
Police signaled him to stop in the Cheltenham Mall area; he drove through the parking lot and was apprehended at Paper Mill Road and Stenton Avenue.
Initially charged with multiple counts including fleeing or eluding as a second-degree misdemeanor; affidavit alleged conduct that endangered officers and the public.
Before trial, Gholson sent a pro se letter criticizing appointed counsel for failing to obtain cellphone records; trial counsel did not move for a continuance earlier and the issue surfaced at trial.
The Commonwealth moved on the eve of trial to amend the fleeing/ eluding count to a third‑degree felony (alleging endangerment during a high-speed chase); the court granted the amendment immediately before jury trial.
Trial counsel’s motion for new counsel during trial was denied; Gholson testified, asserting a defense of fear for his safety (claimed he was fleeing potential robbers). Jury convicted on multiple counts including fleeing as a third‑degree felony; sentence was 1.5–5 years plus probation.

Issue	Appellant's Argument	Commonwealth / Trial Court Argument	Held
Whether trial court abused discretion by denying request to replace appointed counsel mid‑trial	Gholson argued irreconcilable differences and ineffective assistance; sought new counsel or relief due to counsel’s failure to obtain phone records	Court argued no irreconcilable differences shown; dispute concerned effectiveness (appropriate for post‑conviction), not a breakdown in relationship warranting mid‑trial substitution	Denial affirmed — no irreconcilable differences; inquiry adequate; replacement mid‑trial not required
Whether amendment of information upgrading fleeing/eluding to a felony was improper or prejudicial	Gholson argued amendment changed factual scenario, added an element, increased exposure to punishment and prejudiced his defense	Commonwealth/trial court argued underlying elements were same, affidavit and discovery put defendant on notice that flight endangered others, and the amendment did not change his defensive theory (fear for safety)	Amendment affirmed — though grading increased, the basic offense was the same, defendant had notice of endangerment facts, and he was not prejudiced

Commonwealth v. Floyd, 937 A.2d 494 (Pa. Super. 2007) (standards for replacing court‑appointed counsel; must show irreconcilable differences)
Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super. 2006) (test for when amending an information charges a different offense and factors to assess prejudice)
Commonwealth v. Bricker, 882 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 2005) (amendment improper where added facts created a substantially different factual scenario producing prejudice)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (substantive fact-finding that increases penalty must be submitted to jury)
Commonwealth v. Gray, 478 A.2d 822 (Pa. Super. 1984) (recognition that an amendment which increases offense grade is substantive)