Com. v. Fudge, M.
738 MDA 2017
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Sep 25, 2017Background
- Maurice Fudge was convicted by jury on August 18, 2009 of multiple offenses including robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, theft, receiving stolen property, simple assault, and terroristic threats; sentenced October 20, 2009 to an aggregate 10–20 years.
- Direct appeals were unsuccessful: Superior Court affirmed and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in 2012.
- Fudge filed a timely first PCRA petition in August 2012; counsel filed a Turner/Finley no‑merit letter, the PCRA court denied relief in December 2012, and appellate review concluded in 2014.
- On January 26, 2017, Fudge filed a pro se petition captioned as a writ of habeas corpus; the trial court treated it as a PCRA petition and issued Rule 907 notice.
- The court dismissed the 2017 petition as untimely under the PCRA because Fudge’s judgment of sentence became final in August 2012 and he did not invoke a recognized timeliness exception within 60 days.
- Fudge argued the sentencing court imposed an illegal mandatory minimum under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714 and relied on Alleyne, but the court found Alleyne inapplicable retroactively to sentences final before its decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of PCRA petition | Fudge contends his serial petition challenging an illegal mandatory minimum sentence is cognizable and should be considered despite being filed in 2017. | Commonwealth argues the petition is a successive, untimely PCRA filing and jurisdictionally barred because judgment became final in 2012. | Petition is untimely; court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed it. |
| Applicability of Alleyne exception | Fudge invokes Alleyne to attack mandatory minimum sentencing and seeks retroactive relief under the PCRA time‑bar exception for new constitutional rules. | Commonwealth argues Alleyne does not apply retroactively to collateral attacks on sentences final before Alleyne. | Alleyne does not create a retroactive substantive rule applicable to sentences that were final before Alleyne; exception fails. |
| Proper characterization of a habeas filing | Fudge labeled his filing as a habeas corpus petition. | Commonwealth maintained that because the claims are cognizable under the PCRA, the filing must be treated as a PCRA petition. | Court properly treated the filing as a PCRA petition under Peterkin and related authority. |
| Requirement to plead timeliness exceptions | Fudge did not establish a statutory timeliness exception within 60 days of when the claim could have been presented. | Commonwealth emphasized statutory requirement for pleading and proving a timeliness exception. | Fudge failed to meet the § 9545(b) exceptions and thus the petition was time‑barred. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Fudge, 11 A.3d 1019 (Pa. Super. 2010) (prior appeal affirming conviction)
- Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998) (PCRA is the sole means for collateral attack cognizable under the PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) (procedure for counsel seeking to withdraw in post‑conviction proceedings)
- Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (companion authority on counsel withdrawal/no‑merit procedures)
- Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586 (Pa. Super. 2007) (challenge to legality of sentence must be raised in PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2016) (Alleyne does not apply retroactively to collateral attacks on sentences final before Alleyne)
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (U.S. 2013) (holding that facts increasing mandatory minimum are elements that must be submitted to a jury)