281 A.3d 1064
Pa. Super. Ct.2022Background
- On Jan. 18, 2018 police executed a search warrant at 1152 Pine Lane; they seized ~6.68 grams of crack in 40 Ziploc bags, a loaded Glock 19 with a 50-round drum, paperwork bearing Appellant’s name, Appellant’s phone, and $36; Appellant blurted that the drugs and gun were his.
- Investigation that led to the warrant relied on a long-used confidential informant (CI) who directed an unwitting informant (UI) to make four controlled buys at the residence in early January 2018.
- Appellant moved pretrial for discretionary discovery of the four controlled-purchase dates (to impeach the warrant affidavit and potentially develop an alibi); the Commonwealth refused, arguing disclosure would identify and endanger the CI/UI.
- After an evidentiary hearing the trial court denied disclosure of the dates, denied suppression of physical evidence, and in a bench trial convicted Appellant of PWID, possession, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.
- The court sentenced Appellant to concurrent standard-range terms (aggregate 84–180 months). Appellant appealed, challenging (1) denial of the discovery of the controlled-purchase dates and (2) the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying disclosure of the dates of four controlled buys (Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B) / due process) | Disclosure would likely reveal UI/CI identities and endanger the CI; Commonwealth has qualified privilege and met its burden to withhold. | Fretz argued the dates were material to prepare a defense and to impeach the warrant affidavit; Commonwealth failed to show particularized danger and did not prove the dates would identify the CI. | Affirmed. Court did not abuse discretion: Fretz failed to show a good‑faith basis that the affiant willfully misstated facts in the affidavit; dates could lead to CI/UI identification and risk to CI. |
| Whether Appellant’s sentence (within guidelines) was excessive or procedurally flawed (failure to state reasons; misapplied guidelines/double‑counting) | Sentences were within the standard guideline ranges, the court reviewed the PSI and relevant reports, and presumptively reasonable; any double‑counting claim is incorrect under guideline rules. | Fretz argued the sentence was excessive, the court failed to state reasons or consider statutory factors, and the prior drug conviction was double counted in PRS. | Waived for failure to preserve specific discretionary arguments; on the merits no abuse of discretion—standard‑range sentences are presumptively reasonable, court reviewed PSI and materials, and double‑counting claim rejected. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Bonasorte, 486 A.2d 1361 (Pa. Super. 1984) (defendant bears threshold burden to justify disclosure of informant‑related material to challenge affidavit of probable cause)
- Commonwealth v. Hall, 302 A.2d 342 (Pa. 1973) (defendant may challenge affidavit facts by cross‑examining the affiant)
- Commonwealth v. Iannaccio, 480 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1984) (discovery rule requires defendant to make record showing before privileged material is ordered produced)
- Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 674 A.2d 225 (Pa. 1996) (same balancing test for disclosure applies to surveillance‑site information)
- Commonwealth v. Jennings, 630 A.2d 1257 (Pa. Super. 1993) (surveillance site information is privileged and disclosure is discretionary)
- Commonwealth v. Belenky, 777 A.2d 483 (Pa. Super. 2001) (more than a bald assertion is required to obtain informant identity)
- Commonwealth v. Baker, 946 A.2d 691 (Pa. Super. 2008) (public interest in protecting flow of information from informants)
- Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472 (Pa. Super. 2018) (four‑part preservation and review framework for discretionary sentencing claims)
- Commonwealth v. Moye, 266 A.3d 666 (Pa. Super. 2021) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard on sentencing review)
- Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1988) (PSI is presumed to have informed sentencing court)
- Commonwealth v. Jemison, 98 A.3d 1254 (Pa. 2014) (prior conviction may be an element for certain §6105 prosecutions; Jemison does not resolve sentencing‑guidelines double‑count arguments)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warnings)
