Com. v. Frantz, A.
Com. v. Frantz, A. No. 1190 MDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Feb 24, 2017Background
- Andrew Frantz was convicted by a jury of statutory sexual assault, unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of minors, and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse involving his then-14-year-old stepsister.
- The victim testified the abuse began when she was about 13–14 and continued into her mid-teens, including oral, anal, and vaginal acts; she became pregnant at 15.
- Parties agreed pretrial that defense could cross-examine the victim about drug use and paternity of her child but otherwise not explore her sexual history.
- After conviction, the court ordered a PSI and sentenced Frantz to an aggregate term of 8 to 20 years, running one IDSI count consecutively.
- Frantz filed post-sentence motions claiming (1) the sentencing court abused its discretion by relying on his lack of acceptance of responsibility and failing to consider rehabilitative needs, and (2) a mistrial was required because the prosecutor’s closing remark improperly referenced the victim’s sexual history.
- The Superior Court affirmed, holding the sentence was within the standard range and sentencing discretion was properly exercised, and that the prosecutor’s comment, read in context as rebuttal, did not unfairly prejudice the jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sentencing court abused discretion by punishing Frantz for not accepting responsibility and by imposing a consecutive sentence | Frantz: Court relied on his lack of candor and punished him for not accepting responsibility; consecutive sentence was excessive | Commonwealth: Court considered PSI, mitigating and aggravating factors; sentence within standard range and discretionary to run consecutive | Affirmed — no abuse: court reviewed PSI, considered factors, imposed standard-range sentences; consecutive term not unduly harsh |
| Whether prosecutor’s closing remark about Frantz "introducing" the victim to sex required mistrial under pretrial limit on sexual-history evidence | Frantz: Comment violated pretrial agreement and prejudiced jury, warranting mistrial | Commonwealth: Comment was a permissible inference and rebuttal of defense attack on timing/identity of sexual acts | Affirmed — no mistrial: remark, viewed in context and as rebuttal to defense theme, did not create unavoidable prejudice; jury instructed that arguments are not evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270 (Pa. Super. 2004) (requirements for appellate review of discretionary aspects of sentencing)
- Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 2005) (substantial question standard for sentencing challenges)
- Commonwealth v. Bethea, 379 A.2d 102 (Pa. 1977) (plea of not guilty or jury trial should not justify harsher sentence)
- Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2009) (standard-range sentences presumptively reasonable; sentencing discretion on consecutive vs concurrent)
- Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010) (consecutive sentences raise substantial question only in extreme circumstances)
- Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2013) (generic excessiveness claim does not raise a substantial question)
- Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2014) (distinguishing claims that a court failed to consider statutory factors)
- Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612 (Pa. Super. 1992) (presumption that sentencing court considered PSI and relevant factors)
- Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029 (Pa. Super. 2013) (standard for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct and prejudice)
