Com. v. Foster, D.
1689 EDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 25, 2016Background
- Dale Foster was convicted in 1999 of multiple offenses (including aggravated assault, firearms offenses, and related charges) and sentenced to an aggregate term of 24½ to 77 years imprisonment.
- Foster did not file post-sentence motions; this Court affirmed his judgment in 2001. He filed multiple PCRA petitions beginning in 2002, leading to a complex procedural history with reinstatement of appellate rights nunc pro tunc in 2009.
- In 2010 this Court treated a later matter as a direct appeal nunc pro tunc from the 1999 judgment (Foster III), which effectively restarted the clock for PCRA timeliness; Foster’s PCRA filing at issue here was found timely by a subsequent panel and the case was remanded.
- After remand, the PCRA court conducted Grazier proceedings, permitted Foster to proceed pro se, and later issued a Rule 907 notice and dismissed Foster’s PCRA petition on the merits (finding his ineffective-assistance claims meritless).
- Foster appealed, arguing principally that the PCRA court erred by treating his petition as untimely and that due process required additional transcript access; the Superior Court concluded the PCRA court had in fact ruled on the merits and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Foster's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing Foster’s PCRA petition as untimely | Foster contended the dismissal stemmed from PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness and failure to follow the March 26, 2010 mandate (Perez reliance) | Commonwealth and PCRA court treated the petition as timely after Foster III and decided claims on the merits | Court held Foster’s timeliness claim lacked merit because the PCRA court did not dismiss for untimeliness and addressed the claims on the merits |
| Whether Foster was denied due process by lack of transcript access and procedural defects | Foster sought a stay to obtain trial and PCRA transcripts, asserting deprivation of due process and miscarriage of justice | Commonwealth argued proceedings were proper; records and procedural opportunities (Grazier waiver) were afforded | Court rejected due process claim; affirmed dismissal on merits |
| Whether ineffective-assistance claims preserved below were addressed on appeal | Foster asserted successive counsel failed to preserve trial counsel ineffectiveness claims | Commonwealth noted Foster failed to press those substantive claims on appeal and PCRA court found them meritless | Court noted Foster waived those issues on appeal by not developing them; affirmed PCRA court’s merit determination |
| Whether Foster was entitled to appointed PCRA counsel after electing to proceed pro se post-Grazier | Foster sought appointment or reappointment of counsel | PCRA court and this Court denied appointment given Foster elected to proceed pro se after a Grazier hearing | Court upheld denial of appointed counsel; Foster could retain counsel but had waived right to appointed counsel by choosing to proceed pro se |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) (ineffective-assistance claims ordinarily resolved in collateral PCRA proceedings)
- Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (defendant may waive right to counsel and proceed pro se after court inquiry)
- Commonwealth v. Perez, 799 A.2d 848 (Pa. Super. 2002) (mandate/motion practice principles relevant to appellate orders and compliance)
- Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865 (Pa. Super. 2015) (standard of review for PCRA appeal)