Com. v. Fernsler, M.
858 MDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 6, 2016Background
- Michael D. Fernsler pled guilty in 2008 to kidnapping and sexual-assault–related charges and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 to 35 years. He did not file a direct appeal.
- Fernsler filed two prior PCRA petitions (2009 and 2012); both were dismissed and those dismissals were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in 2014.
- On March 2, 2016 Fernsler filed a third PCRA petition relying on Montgomery v. Louisiana to argue retroactive application of several U.S. Supreme Court decisions (Alleyne, Lafler, Frye, Miranda, etc.).
- The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice proposing dismissal as untimely, second/subsequent, and raising previously litigated/waived claims; Fernsler responded but the court entered dismissal on May 11, 2016.
- The court held Fernsler’s petition was time‑barred (judgment final June 13, 2008; one‑year PCRA filing period expired June 13, 2009) and that he failed to satisfy any statutory timeliness exception, including §9545(b)(1)(iii) (new constitutional right held retroactive).
Issues
| Issue | Fernsler's Argument | Commonwealth/ Court's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of PCRA petition | Montgomery makes new substantive rules retroactive and thus renders several Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Alleyne, Frye, Lafler, Miranda) retroactive to collateral review, saving his untimely petition | Judgment became final in 2008; petition filed in 2016 is untimely and no §9545(b) exception applies | Petition untimely; court lacks jurisdiction to reach merits |
| Applicability of Montgomery v. Louisiana | Montgomery’s rule (retroactivity of new substantive rules) broadly makes constitutional decisions retroactive, allowing collateral relief | Montgomery makes retroactive only new substantive rules that control outcome (e.g., Miller) — it does not render longstanding or clarifying decisions retroactive | Montgomery does not rescue Fernsler’s petition; his cited cases do not announce new retroactive substantive rules applicable to him |
| Alleyne-based claim | Alleyne announced a sentencing/jury‑finding rule and thus (via Montgomery) should apply retroactively to invalidate his sentence | Alleyne concerns judicial fact-finding increasing mandatory minimums; Fernsler pleaded guilty under a negotiated plea (no jury fact‑finding or judicial enhancement) | Alleyne inapplicable to Fernsler’s plea/sentence; cannot provide §9545(b)(1)(iii) relief |
| Previously litigated/second-or-subsequent petition doctrine | Claims (ineffective assistance in plea, Miranda issues, sentence length) are newly viable under post‑2012 decisions | Issues were raised or could have been raised in prior proceedings; PCRA bars relitigation absent strong prima facie showing of miscarriage of justice or actual innocence | Petition is successive and raises claims previously litigated or waived; no prima facie showing of miscarriage of justice or innocence |
Key Cases Cited
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (held Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law and that rule must be applied retroactively on state collateral review)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (prohibited mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders)
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (holding facts that increase mandatory minimums must be submitted to a jury)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (addressed prejudice in ineffective‑assistance claims arising from rejected plea offers)
- Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (held defense counsel has duty to communicate plea offers and ineffective assistance can occur during plea bargaining)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (established custodial‑interrogation warning requirements)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (established the two‑part ineffective‑assistance‑of‑counsel test)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (applied Strickland to guilty‑plea context)