297 A.3d 810
Pa. Super. Ct.2023Background
- Appellant Walter Faison was arrested March 14, 2019, after police interrupted him in the lobby of the victim’s apartment with her pants and underwear pulled down; victim testified he had pinned her and put his face near her buttocks while saying he wanted to have sex.
- The parties had an on‑again/off‑again abusive relationship: victim alleged a prior nonconsensual sexual incident on June 29, 2017; Faison had later pled guilty to two terroristic‑threats charges (2017, 2018) and was ordered to have no contact following probation instructions on Feb 25, 2019.
- Faison was charged with attempted rape, attempted sexual assault, two counts of indecent assault, stalking, resisting arrest, institutional vandalism, and related counts; jury convicted on all charged counts except terroristic threats.
- At sentencing (Feb. 11, 2022) mandatory minimums applied (including a 25‑year mandatory minimum under the statutes cited), producing an aggregate sentence of 340–684 months; trial court also ordered lifetime Tier III registration under SORNA Subchapter H.
- Faison filed post‑sentence motions challenging Rule 600 delay denial, admission of prior‑acts evidence, sufficiency of attempted‑rape evidence, several sentencing issues (grading, merger, discretionary excess), and SORNA constitutionality; trial court denied relief and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Faison) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Rule 600 speedy‑trial denial | Time was excludable (defense continuances + judicial emergency/COVID suspension); trial within adjusted run date | Several continuances were not defense‑caused; pandemic exclusion irrelevant because adjusted run date already expired pre‑pandemic | Denial affirmed: defense continuances and COVID judicial‑emergency exclusions extended run date; no Rule 600 violation |
| 2. Admission of prior bad acts (Pa.R.E. 404(b)/403) | Prior acts (prior sexual assault, terroristic threats, PFA, texts) were admissible to prove intent, course of conduct, context; limiting instructions given | Admission of the extensive prior‑acts evidence was unduly prejudicial, cumulative, and some evidence lacked pretrial notice | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion — evidence relevant to intent/absence of consent; limiting instructions and notice issues waived or harmless |
| 3. Sufficiency of evidence for attempted rape | Evidence (victim testimony, officer’s contemporaneous observation, texts, defendant’s statements) supported intent and substantial step toward rape | No substantial step toward penetration; defendant was clothed and only kneeling behind victim when interrupted; prior‑acts testimony should be excluded | Affirmed: evidence sufficient — pinning, forcible removal of pants, verbal statements and prior conduct permitted jury to find intent and substantial step |
| 4. Grading of stalking as felony (18 Pa.C.S. §2709.1) | Defendant’s prior convictions threatening to kill the same victim qualify as prior "crime(s) of violence," permitting third‑degree felony grading | Terroristic threats are not listed and are not defined elsewhere as a crime of violence, so felony grading improper | Affirmed: statute is not limited to enumerated offenses; terroristic threats against same victim qualify as a prior crime of violence for upgraded grading |
| 5. Merger of attempted rape and indecent assault (42 Pa.C.S. §9765) | Distinct offenses with different statutory elements (attempted rape requires intent to intercourse; indecent assault requires touching intimate parts) | Both convictions arose from the same act and should merge for sentencing | Affirmed denial of merger: statutory elements differ, so merger not required |
| 6. Discretionary‑aspects / excessiveness of sentence | Mandatory minimums constrained court (25‑year mandate); PSI present; court presumed to have considered factors; no abuse of discretion shown | Aggregate consecutive sentences (de facto life) were manifestly excessive and not individualized on record | No relief: challenge failed to present a substantial question; court had PSI and mandatory limits; sentencing discretion not abused |
| 7. Stay of SORNA Subchapter H registration pending Torsilieri | Commonwealth: Subchapter H remains presumptively valid while Supreme Court resolves Torsilieri, and registration need not be stayed | Faison: raised same constitutional challenges as in Torsilieri and seeks stay of registration obligations | Denied: Subchapter H not invalidated by the Supreme Court; registration deferred until release and claimant may seek relief later if law changes |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277 (Pa. Super. 2014) (standard of review and dual purposes of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600)
- Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743 (Pa. Super. 2022) (three‑step Rule 600 mechanical/adjusted/final run‑date framework)
- In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1283 (Pa. 2020) (Supreme Court declaration of judicial emergency and suspension mechanisms during COVID‑19)
- Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020) (challenges to Subchapter H of SORNA and remand for evidentiary development)
- Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830 (Pa. 2009) (§ 9765 merger test: single act and element inclusion required for merger)
- Commonwealth v. Edwards, 256 A.3d 1130 (Pa. 2021) (analysis of merger focuses on statutory elements rather than facts)
- Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1988) (presumption that sentencing court considered PSI and relevant factors)
- Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657 (Pa. 2014) (cautionary instructions can ameliorate prejudice from prior‑acts evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Martin, 452 A.2d 1066 (Pa. Super. 1982) (attempted‑rape sufficiency can be established without defendant being undressed)
- Commonwealth v. Claypool, 495 A.2d 176 (Pa. 1985) (Commonwealth may present all relevant evidence; jury decides weight)