Com. v. Evans, E., Com. v. Evans, E. No. 1763 EDA 2016

Background

Eddie Evans was convicted by a jury of robbery (sentenced to 10–20 years) and his direct appeals concluded in 2013.
Evans filed a pro se PCRA petition in December 2014; counsel was appointed and later filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter and motion to withdraw.
The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice; Evans did not respond to the no-merit letter or the Rule 907 notice and filed a premature notice of appeal before the court entered its dismissal on March 21, 2016.
In a Rule 1925(b) statement (filed on appeal), Evans first raised claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress physical evidence (cell phone, discarded phone, and nearby gun) and for not moving to suppress an out‑of‑court identification; he also claimed PCRA counsel was ineffective for not raising the trial-counsel claim earlier.
The PCRA court found police had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Evans, recovered a phone from his person under the plain‑feel doctrine, recovered a discarded phone and a gun nearby, and the complainant made a prompt on‑scene identification; the court dismissed the PCRA petition and allowed counsel to withdraw.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Evans)	Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth)	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file and litigate a motion to suppress physical evidence recovered from Evans (phone from waistband, phone dropped, gun nearby)	Police exceeded a Terry frisk; removal of phone from person was an unconstitutional search/seizure because plain‑feel did not justify taking the phone or treating it as contraband	Police had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk; felt a phone during frisk and properly seized it under plain‑feel; discarded phone and recovered gun were lawfully linked; even if one item excluded, remaining evidence supports conviction	Waived on PCRA (not raised in response to no‑merit letter or Rule 907); merits rejected by PCRA court—stop/frisk and plain‑feel seizure upheld; conviction would stand even if one item excluded
Whether PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial‑counsel ineffectiveness earlier	PCRA counsel should have raised the trial‑counsel suppression claim in the PCRA proceedings	PCRA counsel filed a Turner/Finley no‑merit letter and withdrawal motion; petitioner failed to preserve objections by not responding to that letter or Rule 907 notice	Claim waived under Pitts/Ousley because petitioner did not respond to the no‑merit letter or Rule 907 notice
Whether prior on‑scene identification should have been excluded because complainant later failed to identify at trial	Prior identification was tainted or unreliable and should be excluded, undermining the verdict	Complainant made a prompt, unequivocal on‑scene identification and had signed a prior statement; trial inability to identify did not taint earlier identification	Prior on‑scene identification deemed prompt and reliable; admissible; supports conviction
Whether exclusion of contested evidence would have altered outcome	Without the physical evidence, nothing ties Evans to the robbery and there is a reasonable possibility of a different result	Even without one contested item, other evidence (prompt ID, other recovered items) would sustain conviction	Even if one item were excluded, remaining evidence would have supported conviction

Key Cases Cited

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (establishes stop‑and‑frisk standard of reasonable suspicion and scope of frisk for weapons)
Commonwealth v. Evans, 75 A.3d 550 (Pa. Super. 2013) (prior appellate decision in this defendant's case)
Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009) (requires petitioner to preserve objections to PCRA counsel's no‑merit letter/withdrawal or risk waiver)
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244 (Pa. 2011) (standards for review of PCRA court's legal conclusions)
Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238 (Pa. Super. 2011) (applies Pitts waiver rule to PCRA practice)