Com. v. Ellis, D.
Com. v. Ellis, D. No. 2025 EDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jun 14, 2017Background
- Appellant Dameon Ellis was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, and related offenses for a December 2, 1998 shooting; he received life imprisonment for murder and additional terms for other offenses.
- Direct appeal affirmed; Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in 2002, and the judgment became final on October 14, 2002 (expiration of time to seek U.S. Supreme Court review).
- Ellis filed multiple PCRA petitions; the present filing (his third) was submitted pro se on August 20, 2015.
- The trial court issued Rule 907 notice and dismissed the 2015 PCRA petition as untimely on June 1, 2016.
- On appeal, Ellis argued he qualified for the PCRA timeliness exception based on Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana (claiming a new constitutional rule), and also referenced Alleyne; he also argued broader neurodevelopmental grounds extending juvenile protections to those under 25.
- The Superior Court found the petition patently untimely, held Ellis waived reliance on Miller/Montgomery because he did not raise them in the petition, and rejected any extension of Miller to defendants older than 18 (including 19-year-old Ellis); Alleyne and other legality-of-sentence claims provided no relief because of untimeliness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2015 PCRA petition is timely or fits a statutory timeliness exception | Ellis claimed a "new constitutional right" under Miller/Montgomery (and generally cited developmental science) to overcome the PCRA time-bar | Commonwealth argued the petition is patently untimely and Ellis did not plead any time‑bar exception in the petition; Miller/Montgomery do not apply to a 19‑year‑old | Petition is untimely; Ellis waived Miller/Montgomery by not raising them below and is not entitled to relief because he was 19 at the time of the offense |
| Whether Miller/Montgomery apply retroactively to Ellis | Ellis relied on Miller and Montgomery to assert a new constitutional rule that would excuse untimeliness | Commonwealth noted Miller applies only to defendants under 18 and Montgomery’s retroactivity does not help someone who was 19 | Miller/Montgomery do not apply; Ellis was 19, so no relief |
| Whether Miller’s reasoning should be extended to defendants under 25 based on brain development | Ellis urged extension of juvenile protections to persons under 25 as "technical juveniles" | Commonwealth opposed expansion; prior Superior Court precedent rejected such extension | Court rejected extension; precedent (Furgess) forecloses treating 19‑year‑olds as juveniles for Miller relief |
| Whether Alleyne or other legality challenges salvage untimely claims | Ellis invoked Alleyne and other legality-of-sentence arguments | Commonwealth pointed to precedent that Alleyne is not retroactively applicable to collateral attacks where the judgment became final before Alleyne and that Alleyne does not affect life sentences for first-degree murder | Alleyne provides no relief; legality claims are unreviewable due to untimeliness |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Ellis, 797 A.2d 1022 (Pa. Super. 2002) (direct appeal affirming convictions and sentence)
- Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa. Super. 2016) (PCRA timeliness is jurisdictional)
- Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa. Super. 2016) (rejecting extension of Miller relief to 19‑year‑olds; timeliness/exceptions must be pled in PCRA petition)
- Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358 (Pa. Super. 2013) (legality‑of‑sentence claims under PCRA must satisfy time limits or an exception)
- Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2016) (Alleyne does not warrant retroactive application to collateral attacks when judgment was final before Alleyne)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (holding mandatory life without parole for offenders under 18 violates Eighth Amendment)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (U.S. 2016) (holding Miller announces a substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
