Com. v. Dinkins, F., Com. v. Dinkins, F. No. 407 MDA 2017

Dinkins was charged on two dockets with multiple offenses including aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, firearms and drug offenses.
On February 2, 2017, he entered a negotiated guilty plea and the trial court imposed a negotiated aggregate sentence of 10 to 20 years in prison (sentenced in open court that day; written order entered Feb. 3).
At plea/sentencing Dinkins acknowledged a written plea agreement, that he understood the charges, rights, and that the maximum exposure could be 97 years and substantial fines.
On February 21, 2017 Dinkins filed a pro se letter requesting sentence adjustment; counsel later filed a notice of appeal (March 6) and an Anders brief with a motion to withdraw.
Counsel complied with Anders/Santiago formalities and identified an arguable discretionary–sentencing claim (challenge to consecutive sentences), but Dinkins filed no counseled post-sentence motion and submitted no pro se appellate brief.
The Superior Court determined the pro se post-sentence filing was untimely and a nullity, Dinkins’s notice of appeal was untimely, granted counsel’s petition to withdraw, and quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of appeal / jurisdiction	Dinkins sought relief and appealed after sentence; implied challenge to sentence.	Commonwealth: appeal was untimely; post-sentence procedures and deadlines were not met, depriving court of jurisdiction.	Appeal quashed — sentencing in open court (Feb 2) set deadlines; post-sentence motion due within 10 days and notice of appeal within 30 days; Dinkins missed both.
Validity of pro se post-sentence filing	Dinkins’ Feb 21 letter sought sentence adjustment and served as post-sentence motion.	Commonwealth: a represented defendant cannot file pro se motions; such filings are nullities.	Pro se filing was a nullity because counsel represented Dinkins; it did not toll the appeal period.
Anders compliance and counsel withdrawal	Counsel identified the discretionary-sentencing claim as arguable and filed an Anders brief; Dinkins had right to pursue additional points.	Commonwealth did not oppose Anders procedure.	Counsel substantially complied with Anders and Santiago requirements; court granted withdrawal.
Merits of discretionary–sentencing claim (consecutive sentences)	Counsel argued that consecutive sentencing could be challenged on discretionary grounds.	Commonwealth relied on procedural default (untimeliness) and did not brief the merits.	Court declined to reach merits due to lack of jurisdiction (untimely appeal).

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967) (framework for counsel seeking to withdraw on direct appeal when appeal is frivolous)
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009) (Pennsylvania application/expansion of Anders requirements)
Commonwealth v. Nahavandian, 954 A.2d 625 (Pa. Super. 2008) (date of imposition in open court is the reference for computing appeal and post-sentence deadlines)
Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748 (Pa. Super. 2005) (untimely post-sentence motion does not toll appeal period; untimely appeal must be quashed)
Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349 (Pa. Super. 2007) (pro se filings by represented defendants are invalid; Anders notice requirements)