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Com. v. Davenport, E.
Com. v. Davenport, E. No. 1941 EDA 2016
Pa. Super. Ct.
May 10, 2017
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Background

  • In July 1992, Elmer L. Davenport was convicted of second-degree murder, rape, and theft; sentenced to an aggregate life term.
  • Direct appeals were exhausted and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in 1995; judgments became final thereafter.
  • Davenport filed multiple collateral challenges: a 1996 PCRA petition (dismissed and affirmed) and an October 14, 2015 petition treated as a PCRA petition/habeas corpus filing.
  • In the 2015 filing Davenport argued his murder sentence statute was unconstitutionally vague and thus his sentence was illegal; the court treated the filing under the PCRA because it was a post-judgment collateral challenge.
  • The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice, Davenport responded, and the court dismissed the petition as untimely. Davenport appealed the dismissal to the Superior Court.
  • The Superior Court affirmed, holding the petition was patently untimely and no statutory timeliness exception was pled or proven, depriving the court of jurisdiction to reach the merits.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether Davenport's post-judgment petition could be considered despite being filed after final judgment Davenport contended his sentence statute was void for vagueness, rendering his sentence illegal and justifying relief Commonwealth argued the petition was a PCRA filing outside the one-year statutory time bar and no exception was pleaded Petition was untimely under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); because no timeliness exception was invoked within 60 days, court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition
Whether the petition should be treated as a PCRA petition or habeas corpus/coram nobis Davenport framed it as habeas corpus claiming illegal sentence Commonwealth asserted any post-final-judgment collateral filing is subject to the PCRA (the exclusive remedy) Court treated the filing as a PCRA petition because PCRA subsumes other collateral remedies and provides the sole vehicle for such claims
Whether claims attacking legality of sentence can bypass timeliness requirements Davenport argued illegality of sentence allows consideration despite delay Commonwealth maintained timeliness is jurisdictional and illegality claims still require jurisdictional compliance Court reiterated that legality claims require jurisdiction; absent a timely PCRA exception, court cannot consider merits
Whether any cited precedent permitted relief here Davenport relied on general principles about illegal sentences Commonwealth relied on PCRA timeliness jurisprudence Court applied established PCRA precedent and denied relief because procedural requirements were not satisfied

Key Cases Cited

  • Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190 (Pa. Super. 2012) (standard of review for PCRA dismissal)
  • Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091 (Pa. 2010) (PCRA timeliness is jurisdictional; exceptions and 60-day filing rule)
  • Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011) (post-judgment collateral filings are treated as PCRA petitions)
  • Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2014) (court jurisdiction required to consider legality-of-sentence claims)
  • Commonwealth v. Davenport, 663 A.2d 246 (Pa. Super. 1995) (prior appeal affirming conviction)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Com. v. Davenport, E.
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: May 10, 2017
Docket Number: Com. v. Davenport, E. No. 1941 EDA 2016
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.