Com. v. Crump, M.
Com. v. Crump, M. No. 447 EDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jun 20, 2017Background
- Marvin Crump was convicted in 1983 of second‑degree murder, robbery, conspiracy, and firearms offenses and sentenced to life imprisonment; direct review concluded in 1993 when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur.
- Crump filed multiple collateral filings: a first PCRA (1997) dismissed as untimely, a second PCRA (2008, supplements through 2013) dismissed as untimely, a habeas petition (2013) dismissed as untimely, and the instant ‘‘Application for Relief’’ (August 27, 2014) plus many related filings.
- The PCRA court issued notice of intent to dismiss the 2014 petition and dismissed it on January 6, 2016 for being untimely and successive; Crump appealed pro se.
- Crump’s claims challenged (a) the absence of a written sentencing order in the record and DOC authority to detain him, (b) sufficiency of evidence, and (c) retroactivity/ex post facto concerns tied to case law and statutory interpretation.
- The Superior Court reviewed only timeliness as jurisdictional and whether any statutory exception to the PCRA one‑year time bar was invoked; Crump did not plead any of the three statutory exceptions or comply with the 60‑day filing requirement for exceptions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Crump) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth/PCRA Ct.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / PCRA jurisdiction | Crump argued his filings should not be treated as untimely PCRA petitions because no final sentencing order existed in the certified record | Court maintained PCRA time limits apply; judgment became final in 1993 and petition filed in 2014 is facially untimely | Dismissed as untimely; PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review merits absent an exception |
| Invocation of PCRA exceptions | Crump asserted various procedural/retroactivity theories but did not properly invoke statutory exceptions | Commonwealth noted Crump failed to allege or prove any §9545(b)(1) exception or timely file within 60 days of claiming an exception | No exception pled or proven; petition not saved by exceptions |
| Challenge to DOC authority / absence of written sentencing order | Crump contended DOC lacked authority to detain him without a written sentencing order in the certified record | Commonwealth/PCRA court relied on precedent that a validly imposed sentence recorded in the record is sufficient to authorize detention | Claim construed as habeas‑type challenge and held meritless under Joseph v. Glunt; DOC detention authorized |
| Retroactivity / ex post facto / Joseph v. Glunt application | Crump argued retroactive judicial/statutory changes deprived him of due process and that Joseph v. Glunt was misapplied | Court treated those contentions as meritless or irrelevant to timeliness, and noted Crump did not identify a newly recognized constitutional right | Court rejected retroactivity/ex post facto theory as not saving the untimely petition |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238 (Pa. Super. 2011) (standard of review for PCRA denials)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171 (Pa. Super. 2015) (PCRA timeliness is jurisdictional; one‑year filing rule)
- Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365 (Pa. Super. 2014) (a sentencing record suffices to authorize detention even without a separate written sentencing order)