Com. v. Cook, P.
381 MDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 27, 2016Background
- Patrick L. Cook was convicted by jury (Nov. 2013) of aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and corruption of minors for offenses against victims under 13; he proceeded pro se at trial with standby counsel.
- At sentencing (Feb. 2014) the court imposed aggregate 11–22 years based on two mandatory minimums under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718 tied to victims’ ages; Cook was notified of post‑sentence and direct appeal rights but did not file a direct appeal.
- Cook filed a timely pro se PCRA petition (Feb. 2015); counsel was appointed and an amended petition and an evidentiary PCRA hearing followed (Dec. 2015).
- PCRA claims: (1) trial court failed to conduct the Rule 121 waiver‑of‑counsel colloquy, so Cook’s pro se waiver was not knowing/intelligent; (2) trial court improperly denied a request to let standby counsel assume full representation during trial.
- PCRA court denied relief; on appeal the Superior Court affirmed those holdings but, sua sponte, vacated Cook’s sentence and remanded for resentencing under Alleyne principles because the mandatory minimum scheme used judicial fact‑finding to increase punishment.
Issues
| Issue | Cook's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Validity of Rule 121 waiver colloquy | Waiver was defective because court did not elicit elements, sentencing range, procedural consequences, or loss of defenses, so waiver was not knowing/intelligent | Any colloquy defects were waived (could be raised on direct appeal); Cook repeatedly insisted on proceeding pro se and misconduct justified forfeiture; no prejudice shown | Waiver‑colloquy challenge waived; alternatively, no relief because Cook would have proceeded pro se anyway and standby counsel had informed him of Rule 121 matters; forfeiture/misconduct also supported court’s approach |
| 2) Trial court’s refusal to let standby counsel assume representation mid‑trial | Cook asserts he requested standby counsel take over representation and trial court wrongly refused | Request was interpreted as seeking hybrid representation; not clearly a revocation of waiver; issue could have been raised on direct appeal and is waived | No relief: record doesn’t show a clear revocation request; hybrid representation improper; claim waived on collateral review; self‑representation limits postconviction claims of standby counsel ineffectiveness |
| 3) Legality of sentence (mandatory minimums under § 9718) | Mandatory minimums were applied by judicial fact‑finding based on victims’ ages | (Implicit) Mandatory minimums were properly applied at sentencing | Sua sponte vacated sentence and remanded for resentencing without the § 9718 mandatory minimums under Alleyne; judgment of sentence vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts that increase mandatory penalties are elements for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244 (Pa. 2011) (Rule 121 waiver colloquy is procedural; ineffective‑assistance claim for counsel’s failure to object requires prejudice analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686 (Pa. 2008) (prejudice standard for counsel’s failure to object to defective waiver colloquy; consider totality of circumstances)
- Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739 (Pa. 2014) (a defendant who chooses to represent himself cannot obtain postconviction relief by claiming his own ineffectiveness or that of standby counsel)
- Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016) (42 Pa.C.S. § 9718 facially unconstitutional under Alleyne where judicial fact‑finding increases mandatory minimums)
- Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370 (Pa.Super. 2010) (Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 colloquy requirements need not apply when defendant forfeits right to counsel through misconduct)
- Commonwealth v. Tabu Nazshon Phillips, 93 A.3d 847 (Pa.Super. 2014) (confirming that a defective Rule 121 colloquy on direct appeal can require vacatur without separate prejudice proof)