Com. v. Caulk, R., 220 A.3d 1102

Background

Two controlled buys from Rasheen Caulk by confidential informant Anthony Reaves on March 21, 2016 and April 20, 2016; troopers searched Reaves and his car and gave him $4,800 each time to buy 125 grams of cocaine.
March buy: Trooper Bromberg observed Appellant exit a Jeep, enter Reaves’ vehicle for ~1 minute; audio recording captured Reaves’ and Appellant’s voices; troopers recovered ~124.5 g of cocaine at the post‑buy meeting.
April buy: location changed; video showed Appellant driving and Reaves entering Appellant’s car; audio had ambient noise and no explicit drug discussion; troopers recovered ~124.64 g of cocaine at the post‑buy meeting.
Reaves was shot and killed on July 31, 2017. Trial court allowed the Commonwealth to tell the jury Reaves was deceased but excluded evidence about the manner/cause of death. Prosecutor referenced his death in closing without alleging Appellant’s involvement.
Trooper testimony included two inadvertent references that “we” purchased the cocaine from Appellant; both were corrected or probed on cross‑examination. The Commonwealth amended the information to reflect the Philadelphia location of the March buy.
Jury convicted Caulk of two counts of PWID; he was sentenced to 100–240 months. The Superior Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of informant's death (motion in limine)	Commonwealth: jury should be told Reaves is dead to explain his absence and avoid blaming prosecution	Caulk: mention of death is irrelevant and prejudicial—suggests Caulk killed informant	Court: permissibly allowed the fact of death but excluded manner/cause; balanced interests—no abuse of discretion
Prosecutor's closing comment about informant's death / mistrial request	Commonwealth: comment explained absence of witness and urged jury to rely on other evidence	Caulk: comment implied Caulk killed Reaves and demanded mistrial	Court: comment did not allege Caulk’s responsibility; denial of mistrial was not an abuse of discretion
Admission of evidence about Caulk using rental cars not in his name	Commonwealth: shows relationship to vehicles used in transactions and planning of sales	Caulk: irrelevant and prejudicial character evidence	Court: relevant to link Caulk to vehicles and methods; admission was within court’s discretion
Trooper Garcia’s statements that “we” purchased cocaine from Caulk / ultimate‑issue testimony and mistrial	Commonwealth: incidental misstatements, corrected and explored; not expert ultimate‑issue testimony	Caulk: statements improperly opined on ultimate issue and warranted mistrial	Court: statements were inadvertent, corrected, and probed on cross; no prejudice and no mistrial needed
Amendment of information adding Philadelphia location / jurisdiction or venue challenge	Commonwealth: Delaware County court had jurisdiction and defendant had notice; facts developed at preliminary hearing	Caulk: Philadelphia sale outside Delaware County—court lacked authority or venue improper	Court: jurisdiction proper; issue was venue (not jurisdiction) and Caulk waived venue claim by not raising it pretrial; amendment did not prejudice him

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Kane, 188 A.3d 1217 (Pa. Super. 2018) (standard on evidentiary abuse of discretion for motions in limine)
Commonwealth v. Goldman, 70 A.3d 874 (Pa. Super. 2013) (discretion must be exercised reasonably; balancing probative value and prejudice)
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74 (Pa. Super. 2012) (erroneous evidentiary rulings require prejudice to be reversible)
Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 41 A.3d 892 (Pa. Super. 2012) (standard for granting or denying mistrial)
In re D.G., 114 A.3d 1094 (Pa. Super. 2015) (factors for permitting amendment to an information)
Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205 (Pa. 2007) (jurisdictional issues reviewed de novo)
Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066 (Pa. 2003) (distinction between venue and jurisdiction)
Commonwealth v. McPhail, 692 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1997) (place of trial is a venue question)