Com. v. Campbell, M.
1744 WDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 28, 2016Background
- Maurice R. Campbell pled guilty to DUI under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1) (presence of any amount of a Schedule I controlled substance) and driving with suspended privileges after his vehicle struck and killed an 8‑year‑old skateboarder.
- Blood tests showed active Delta‑9 THC and a metabolite; BAC .074; Appellant admitted to using marijuana and several drinks earlier that day. Two other DUI counts (impairment-based) were withdrawn.
- At sentencing the child’s mother, Jamie Grimenstein, was allowed over objection to give a victim impact statement; the court sentenced Appellant to 3–6 months’ imprisonment (maximum for the misdemeanor count).
- Appellant argued the mother was not a "victim" under the Crime Victims Act because he was not convicted of an offense against the child, and that consideration of the child’s death rendered the sentence manifestly excessive.
- The Commonwealth conceded the mother may not qualify as a victim under the Act but argued any error was harmless because the record already established the fatal accident and the DUI facts.
- The Superior Court found admission of the mother’s testimony erroneous (no prior finding that the death was a direct result of the DUI) but held the error harmless because the fatality was a proper sentencing consideration given the zero‑tolerance nature of § 3802(d)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court abused discretion by permitting victim impact testimony from the child’s mother | Commonwealth: her statement described harm from the convicted crime and was relevant to sentencing | Campbell: mother is not a "victim" under Crime Victims Act because he was not convicted of an offense against the child; testimony was irrelevant and violated due process | Court: admission was erroneous because no finding the child’s death was a direct result of the criminal act, so mother did not qualify as "victim" under the Act without that showing, but error was harmless on these facts |
| Whether sentencing was manifestly excessive for relying on the child’s death as an aggravating factor | Campbell: elevating sentence based on the fatality was impermissible and excessive because causation was contested and he wasn't convicted of homicide | Commonwealth: fatality and stipulation to facts (marijuana present; fatal crash) made the death relevant to community harm and deterrence; any error in testimony harmless | Court: considering the fatality was permissible. Zero‑tolerance § 3802(d)(1) means mere presence of marijuana poses an unacceptable risk; the fatality actualized that risk, so aggravation was justified and not excessive |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Smithton, 631 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. 1993) (victim impact testimony improper where convictions were unrelated to the alleged victims)
- Commonwealth v. Ali, 112 A.3d 1210 (Pa. Super. 2015) (insufficient connection between defendant’s offenses and later fatalities precluded victim impact evidence tied to those deaths)
- Commonwealth v. Walker, 666 A.2d 301 (Pa. Super. 1995) (DUI victims may be entitled to restitution where injury is a direct result of the crime; causation requirement applies)
- Commonwealth v. Tobin, 89 A.3d 663 (Pa. Super. 2014) (procedural requirements and substantial‑question standard for appellate review of discretionary sentencing)