Com. v. Brindle, M., 443 WDA 2016

Appellant Michael R. Brindle pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit retail theft and was sentenced on February 2, 2016, to 4–10 months’ incarceration and restitution; he was immediately paroled for time served.
Appellant filed a pro se "notice of appeal" on March 28, 2016 asserting his trial counsel failed to respond to his request to exercise post‑sentencing rights.
Trial counsel (Black) sought to withdraw; the trial court appointed successive counsel (Walchesky then Harris). The Superior Court initially denied Black’s withdrawal in this Court until the trial court’s appointment order was provided.
Appellate counsel (Harris) filed an Anders brief raising a single issue: whether a timely notice of appeal was filed. The record showed sentencing occurred February 2, 2016 and the docketed notice was March 28, 2016.
The Superior Court found the notice, as docketed, was patently untimely but considered whether the pro se filing should be treated as a PCRA petition because it alleged counsel failed to pursue post‑sentencing rights (an ineffective assistance claim).
The Court denied counsel’s Anders withdrawal request and remanded for appointed counsel to file an amended PCRA petition (e.g., requesting nunc pro tunc reinstatement of direct appeal rights or other PCRA relief).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the appeal was timely	Brindle (through pro se filing) asserted counsel failed to pursue post‑sentencing rights; implied appeal filed March 28	Commonwealth: appeal period lapsed (30 days from sentencing on Feb 2); notice untimely	Appeal was patently untimely as filed March 28; Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over a late direct appeal
Whether the pro se filing should be treated as a PCRA petition	Brindle’s notice alleged counsel’s failure—effectively an ineffective assistance claim seeking relief	Commonwealth: not directly argued, but Court must decide classification based on relief sought	Court held the notice may be construed as a PCRA petition because it raises counsel ineffectiveness cognizable under the PCRA
Whether appointed counsel may withdraw under Anders	Appellate counsel sought to withdraw after filing an Anders brief asserting no nonfrivolous issues	Implicit: appellant needs PCRA relief rather than Anders review of direct appeal	Court denied Anders withdrawal because procedural posture required PCRA treatment and further action on collateral relief
Appropriate remedy/procedure	Brindle sought to pursue appellate/post‑sentencing rights	Commonwealth’s position: appeal untimely; but PCRA available for relief like nunc pro tunc reinstatement	Court remanded for counsel to file an amended PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc or other appropriate PCRA relief

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967) (standards for counsel seeking to withdraw on direct appeal)
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009) (Pa. standards for Anders withdrawals and appellate counsel duties)
Commonwealth v. Burks, 102 A.3d 497 (Pa. Super. 2014) (court lacks jurisdiction over untimely appeals)
Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779 A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. 2001) (filings seeking PCRA remedies should be treated as PCRA petitions)
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (PCRA categorization principles)
Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998) (PCRA principles on collateral petitions)
Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717 (Pa. Super. 2007) (analyzing motion content to determine PCRA treatment)
Commonwealth v. Lutz, 788 A.2d 993 (Pa. Super. 2001) (PCRA cognizability of certain filings)
Commonwealth v. Lusch, 759 A.2d 6 (Pa. Super. 2000) (ineffective assistance claims cognizable under PCRA)
Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259 (Pa. Super. 2001) (pro se post‑conviction filings treated as PCRA petitions when appropriate)
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279 (Pa. Super. 2011) (prisoner mailbox rule for filing dates)