Com. v. Braxton, T.
296 MDA 2017
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Sep 19, 2017Background
- Terell Braxton was convicted by jury in April 2008 of multiple drug and related offenses and sentenced in August 2008 to an aggregate term of 103–264 months plus probation.
- Direct appeal rights were later reinstated nunc pro tunc; this Court affirmed the judgment in 2010 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in 2011.
- Complex PCRA proceedings followed; this Court remanded in December 2013 for the trial court to consider the newly discovered facts exception to an otherwise untimely PCRA petition.
- On November 25, 2015, while represented by counsel, Braxton withdrew his PCRA petition and waived PCRA appellate rights as part of a negotiated agreement; the court imposed a reduced sentence (time served to 264 months, plus two years probation) and entered a written order on January 21, 2016. Braxton did not appeal that new sentence.
- Braxton later filed pro se motions (June and September 2016) seeking to vacate the January 21, 2016 order and resume his PCRA petition, claiming the new sentence was illegal; the trial court denied relief on January 19, 2017 and he appealed.
- The Superior Court held the post-judgment pro se filing should have been treated as a first PCRA petition and remanded for appointment of counsel, vacating the January 19, 2017 order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the post-judgment pro se motion challenging the new sentence should be treated as a PCRA petition | Braxton argued the January 2016 order/sentence was illegal and sought to vacate it and resume his PCRA petition | Commonwealth/trial court treated the filing as an untimely post-sentence motion and denied relief | The Superior Court held the filing, made after judgment became final, must be treated as a first PCRA petition |
| Whether Braxton was entitled to appointed counsel for this post-judgment collateral challenge | Braxton proceeded pro se and asserted illegality of sentence; implicitly sought counsel via relief | Trial court did not appoint counsel and denied motion (citing hybrid representation issues) | Court held a petitioner is entitled to counsel for a first PCRA petition and remanded for appointment of counsel |
| Whether the substance of Braxton’s claim (illegality of sentence based on alleged guarantees/unconstitutional statute) barred relief without counsel | Braxton contended the sentence was illegal and based on promises/statute defects | Commonwealth argued procedural requirements and prior waiver/agreements foreclosed relief | Court did not reach merits; ruled entitlement to counsel applies regardless of apparent merit and left substantive issues for PCRA court with counsel appointed |
| Effect of prior waiver of PCRA rights achieved at the plea/agreeance hearing | Braxton claimed he could not agree to an illegal sentence despite earlier waiver | Commonwealth relied on waiver and the negotiated disposition | Court recognized the waiver but remanded for the appointed counsel to assess and litigate any waiver effect |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 749 A.2d 502 (Pa. Super. 2000) (post-judgment motion framed as motion to correct illegal sentence must be treated as a PCRA petition)
- Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011) (PCRA is sole means to seek collateral relief for illegal sentences; filings after judgment final are treated as PCRA petitions)
- Commonwealth v. Hockenberry, 689 A.2d 283 (Pa. Super. 1997) (legality of sentence is cognizable under the PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455 (Pa. Super. 2009) (criminal defendant has right to counsel for first PCRA petition through appellate process)
- Commonwealth v. Wiley, 966 A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. 2009) (PCRA petitioner is entitled to counsel for first PCRA petition regardless of claim merits)
- Commonwealth v. Evans, 866 A.2d 442 (Pa. Super. 2005) (waiver of counsel entitlement must be made to the PCRA court after addressing entitlement to appointed counsel)