Com. v. Boyd, W., Com. v. Boyd, W. No. 1612 EDA 2015

In 2011 William Boyd was arrested for selling crack cocaine; a warrant search found a handgun and he was charged with drug offenses and unlawful firearm possession (he was prohibited from possessing a firearm).
The trial court granted the defense motion to bifurcate the drug charges from the firearm charge; at the first trial defense counsel twice incorrectly told the jury Boyd was not facing gun charges, prompting the judge to grant a mistrial at defense counsel’s request.
At the second trial the jury deliberated across three days (about 10–11 hours total); the judge observed loud, contentious deliberations and some antagonistic body language in the jury room.
On the third day the jury sent a note asking to be recognized as a hung jury; the court questioned the foreperson and then individually polled each juror, each confirming they were deadlocked and further deliberations would be fruitless.
The trial court declared a mistrial based on manifest necessity; Boyd moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, which the court denied. Boyd filed an interlocutory appeal; the Superior Court affirmed the denial.

Issue	Boyd's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by declaring a mistrial over Boyd’s objection without manifest necessity and without first using less drastic alternatives	The court lacked manifest necessity; the mistrial was premature and the court should have given a second Spencer charge instead of ending the trial	The jury was genuinely deadlocked; the court properly inquired of the foreperson and each juror and acted within its discretion to declare mistrial	Affirmed: a hung jury constituted manifest necessity; court did not abuse discretion and was not required to re-instruct (Spencer charge)

Commonwealth v. Spencer, 275 A.2d 299 (Pa. 1971) (defines Spencer charge and its purpose)
Commonwealth v. Bartolomucci, 362 A.2d 234 (Pa. 1976) (procedural guidance for declaring mistrials when jury expresses inability to agree)
Commonwealth v. Greer, 951 A.2d 346 (Pa. 2008) (trial court discretion to give Spencer charge; abuse-of-discretion standard)
Commonwealth v. Monte, 329 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1974) (a genuine inability to agree by jury constitutes manifest necessity for mistrial)
Commonwealth v. Orie, 22 A.3d 1021 (Pa. 2011) (consider totality of circumstances in reviewing mistrial declarations)
Commonwealth v. Culver, 51 A.3d 866 (Pa. Super. 2012) (trial judge’s observations of non-verbal jury behavior may inform decision where transcript is silent)
Commonwealth v. Myers, 405 A.2d 1252 (Pa. Super. 1979) (mistrial following judicial inquiry confirming deadlock upheld)