Com. v. Alexander, J., Com. v. Alexander, J. No. 1631 WDA 2016

Johntae Alexander pleaded guilty on Sept. 8, 2015 to possession with intent to deliver heroin and was sentenced to 5–10 years on Oct. 21, 2015; no post-sentence motion or direct appeal was filed.
He filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on June 16, 2016 alleging trial counsel was ineffective in two respects: failing to advise that a guilty plea forecloses challenging the suppression ruling on appeal, and failing to litigate the lawfulness of the initial investigatory stop at a train station.
The suppression hearing record: police stopped Alexander after a confidential informant tip, conducted two successive pat-downs (the second recovered heroin), the officers lacked a warrant, and the trial court characterized the encounter as an investigative detention.
At the plea hearing Alexander received a one-page written plea form and a group oral colloquy; defense counsel did not speak during the hearing and the plea forms/colloquy did not expressly explain how a guilty plea limits appellate challenges to suppression rulings.
The PCRA court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding the suppression motion lacked merit and that any appellate challenge would have failed; the Superior Court reversed and remanded for a hearing on counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Issue	Alexander's Argument	Commonwealth/PCRA Court Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not advising that a guilty plea waives most appellate challenges (including the suppression ruling) and thus rendered Alexander's plea unknowing/involuntary	Counsel failed to explain that pleading guilty would foreclose appeal of the suppression denial; plea colloquy and form didn’t inform him, and counsel said nothing at the hearing	PCRA court/Commonwealth: plea was knowing and voluntary; any challenge to suppression would have failed so no prejudice	Superior Court: genuine factual issue whether counsel competently advised about appellate consequences; remanded for an evidentiary hearing
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to fully litigate/challenge the lawfulness of the initial investigatory stop at the train station, causing Alexander to plead	Counsel did not meaningfully develop informant reliability or reasonable-suspicion arguments at suppression hearing and did not file further support as directed; this may have forfeited potentially meritorious suppression claims	PCRA court/Commonwealth: trial judge found investigatory detention reasonable and concluded any appeal would fail, so no prejudice from counsel’s omissions	Superior Court: record shows unresolved factual/legal questions about reasonable suspicion and counsel’s performance; remanded for a hearing

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567 (Pa. 2003) (three-prong ineffective-assistance test for PCRA claims)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice standard for counsel’s advice on guilty pleas)
Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185 (Pa. Super. 2013) (counsel’s plea advice and voluntariness principles)
Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 750 A.2d 807 (Pa. 2000) (reasonable suspicion standard for investigatory stops; totality of circumstances and informant reliability)
Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335 (Pa. Super. 2012) (effective assistance includes advising client on consequences of pleading guilty)