Columbus, Georgia v. Expedia, Inc.
4:11-cv-00104
M.D. Ga.Sep 14, 2011Background
- Plaintiff filed the action in state court; defendant removed to this court on August 1, 2011, asserting diversity jurisdiction.
- This is the third attempted removal; prior removals occurred in 2006 and 2007 with remands for lack of jurisdiction over amount in controversy.
- Plaintiff’s First Amended and Recast Complaint claimed attorney’s fees and expenses, allegedly exceeding the jurisdictional amount, prompting new removal discussions in 2011.
- Removal statutes are interpreted narrowly; § 1446(b) contains a one-year limit on removal based on diversity after commencement of the action.
- The court held the removal in 2011 was untimely under § 1446(b)’s one-year limit and remanded the case to state court for lack of jurisdiction.
- The court declined to adopt an equitable exception to the one-year bar and refused to revisit whether the case was removable at inception.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the one-year removal bar under § 1446(b) jurisdictional or procedural? | Untimely removal may be remanded; bar is jurisdictional in some views. | The one-year bar is not jurisdictional and may be waived or overlooked in certain contexts. | Untimeliness is procedural; remand possible when timely objection is raised. |
| Does equitable estoppel override the one-year removal limitation? | Equitable estoppel could prevent removal after the one-year period. | Tedford equitable exception may apply to timeliness. | Court declines to adopt equitable estoppel and rejects Tedford exception. |
| Does the case’s origination as removable affect application of the one-year bar? | If originally removable, the one-year bar might not apply. | One-year bar applies regardless of initial removability; court will not revisit prior orders. | One-year bar applies; remand appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996) (removal statute's one-year limit strict interpretation)
- Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 1994) (uncertainties resolved in favor of remand when jurisdiction is disputed)
- Moore v. N. Am. Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2010) (untimeliness of removal is a procedural defect)
- Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2010) (untimeliness as procedural, not jurisdictional)
- In re Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 104 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1997) (procedural nature of removal timeliness)
- Loftin v. Loftin, 767 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1985) (timeliness may be waived, but default rule favors remand)
- Jones Management Services, LLC v. KES, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 892 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (cautions against equitable exceptions to removal statute)
- Graham Comm. Realty, Inc. v. Shamsi, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (caution against changing jurisdictional policy via judicial edits)
- Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003) (equitable exception to removal timeliness not adopted)
- Carter v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 144 F. App’x 815 (11th Cir. 2005) (one-year bar applies to non-originally removable actions)
