495 F.Supp.3d 88
E.D.N.Y2020Background
- Plaintiff operates a Brooklyn food‑service establishment that historically earns substantial revenue from after‑midnight service.
- New York lifted the indoor dining ban on Sept. 30, 2020, allowing 25% capacity but imposing a rule barring service after midnight (the “midnight close rule”) plus other safety requirements.
- Plaintiff sued seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the midnight close rule, asserting substantive due process violations (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) and an Article 78 challenge that the rule is arbitrary and capricious.
- Governor defended the rule as a public‑health measure to reduce extended indoor mingling (and alcohol‑related mask noncompliance) in densely populated New York City.
- The court applied the Jacobson emergency‑public‑health standard, concluded plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits, and denied the preliminary injunction; the court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Article 78 claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicable standard for review of pandemic restrictions | Jacobson controls; heightened scrutiny of arbitrary restrictions | State argues rational‑basis review; measures should get deference | Court applied Jacobson (deferential emergency‑health standard) and said outcome same under rational basis |
| Substantive due process challenge to midnight close rule | Rule arbitrarily curtails right to do lawful business; no reason transmission is greater after midnight; NYC singled out | Rule has real/substantial relation to public health by reducing extended indoor mingling when masks are removed; NYC density justifies distinction | Court: plaintiff unlikely to succeed; rule is reasonably related to pandemic control and not a total deprivation of the right to do business |
| Irreparable harm / balance of equities / public interest | Loss of business is irreparable and injunction necessary for survival | Enjoining public‑health measures risks community spread; state has strong interest in combatting COVID‑19 | Court: harms balance against plaintiff; public interest favors upholding restrictions |
| Article 78 claim and federal jurisdiction | Article 78 claim alleges Governor acted arbitrarily and capriciously | State contends Article 78 is a state procedural remedy and federal courts should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction | Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Article 78 claim and therefore did not grant relief on that basis |
Key Cases Cited
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (establishes deferential standard for public‑health emergency measures)
- New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (right to conduct business may be conditioned by regulation)
- Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (courts should not invalidate business regulations as unwise)
- S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (Chief Justice Roberts concurrence: courts should defer to public‑health judgments during pandemic)
- In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2020) (courts should not second‑guess state emergency measures; examine for arbitrariness or pretext)
- In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020) (discusses limits of judicial review of COVID‑19 restrictions)
- Cunney v. Bd. of Trustees of Vill. of Grand View, 660 F.3d 612 (2d Cir. 2011) (substantive due process protects against arbitrary or conscience‑shocking government action)
- Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 1995) (governmental policies from democratic processes receive greater deference)