Colton v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
3:15-cv-01962
D. Or.Sep 28, 2016Background
- Linda Colton (b.1955) applied for DIB and SSI alleging disability beginning Sept. 1, 2011 based on diabetes with neuropathy, recurrent cellulitis, COPD, coronary disease (post-MI with stent), depression, and mild neuropsychological impairment.
- Application denied at initial/reconsideration levels; ALJ hearing held April 15, 2015; ALJ found Colton not disabled on June 11, 2015; Appeals Council denied review; Colton sought district-court review.
- ALJ found severe impairments: diabetes with peripheral neuropathy, recurrent cellulitis, COPD, and status-post MI; nonsevere: hypertension, obesity, sleep apnea, depression.
- ALJ adopted two RFC periods: (1) amended onset to June 30, 2013 — light work with about 5 hours total sit/stand/walk in 8-hour day and avoidance of concentrated respiratory exposures; (2) June 30, 2013–decision date — sedentary work with additional postural, foot-control, and hazard/exposure limits.
- ALJ found Colton could perform her past work as an admitting clerk under both RFCs and therefore not disabled.
- Magistrate Judge Clarke recommended reversal and remand because the Appeals Council-added opinions from Drs. Brewer and Manning created unresolved conflicts and material ambiguities that the ALJ did not address; those opinions could change the disability analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| ALJ's evaluation of Colton's subjective symptom testimony | Colton argued the ALJ improperly discounted her testimony about pain, numbness, concentration, and memory. | Commissioner contended ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons (poor diabetes management, symptom improvement on medication, limited objective findings). | Court held ALJ provided clear and convincing, rational reasons to discount Colton's subjective testimony. |
| ALJ's treatment of lay-witness (mother) testimony | Colton argued ALJ failed to give germane reasons for discounting her mother’s statements about functional limits. | Commissioner conceded error but asserted it was harmless because lay testimony duplicated claimant’s rejected assertions. | Court found error harmless because lay testimony did not add limitations beyond Colton's own (properly discounted) testimony. |
| Weight given to examining/other medical opinions (Dr. Trueblood) | Colton argued the ALJ ignored that Trueblood diagnosed neuropsychological impairment and recommended gradual, low-stress return to work. | Commissioner: Trueblood found only mild impairment and only recommended (not mandated) gradual/low-stress return; ALJ reasonably incorporated the mild finding. | Court held ALJ reasonably credited Trueblood’s mild impairment opinion and permissibly declined to adopt a non-mandatory recommendation. |
| New medical opinions considered by Appeals Council (Drs. Brewer & Manning) | Colton argued the new opinions (esp. Manning) show greater limitations that would undermine the RFC and past-work finding. | Commissioner noted Appeals Council considered but found no basis to change ALJ’s decision; some opinions conflict with existing record/other providers. | Court held ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting Brewer and Manning; their opinions created material conflicts and ambiguities requiring remand for further proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Keyser v. Comm'r, 648 F.3d 721 (9th Cir. 2011) (summarizing the five-step disability evaluation)
- Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2001) (allocation of burdens at steps one through five)
- Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2012) (failure to follow prescribed treatment may undermine credibility)
- Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007) (weighting treating/examining/reviewing opinions)
- Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1998) (ALJ must give specific, legitimate reasons to reject evidence)
- Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403 (9th Cir. 2015) (standards for remand for further proceedings vs. immediate benefits)
- Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2014) (prerequisites for remand with award of benefits)
