599 S.W.3d 344
Ark. Ct. App.2020Background
- Resident Jeffrey Watton was admitted to Colonel Glenn Health & Rehab on May 5, 2017; admission and arbitration agreements were executed by his wife, Mary Joanne Watton, as the designated "Responsible Party."
- The agreements define "Responsible Party" to include a legal guardian, an attorney-in-fact (POA), or "some other individual or family member who agrees to assist the Facility"; Mary wrote "wife" on the relationship line and did not check a box indicating POA/guardianship, and she is not Jeffrey's guardian or attorney-in-fact.
- Jeffrey did not sign the arbitration agreement; the agreement waived trial by judge or jury and required binding arbitration of disputes arising from care.
- Teresa Aldrich (Jeffrey’s daughter and special administrator) sued for negligence, malpractice, and statutory violations; Colonel Glenn moved to compel arbitration, asserting Mary signed in her individual capacity and that Jeffrey is bound as a third-party beneficiary.
- The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration and declined to supply Rule 52(a)(1) findings; on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Jeffrey because Mary lacked authority to bind him and the third-party-beneficiary doctrine did not apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the circuit court erred by not making findings of fact and conclusions of law under Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) | Aldrich: failure to make explicit findings not prejudicial; order denying arbitration is appealable but findings unnecessary | Colonel Glenn: Rule 52(a)(1) required because order denying motion to compel arbitration is a judgment under Rule 54(a) | Court: Rule 52(a)(1) findings not required for motions to compel arbitration; omission not reversible error |
| Whether Jeffrey is bound to arbitrate where his wife signed as "Responsible Party" but lacked POA/guardianship | Aldrich: Mary lacked authority to act for Jeffrey; signature was in representative, not individual, capacity; arbitration unenforceable against Jeffrey | Colonel Glenn: contractual language allowed a Responsible Party to sign in individual capacity to assist care; Jeffrey is intended third-party beneficiary and must arbitrate | Court: ambiguous whether Mary signed individually; construed against drafter; Mary lacked authority, so no valid agreement with her and third-party-beneficiary doctrine does not bind Jeffrey; denial of motion to compel affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Hickory Heights Health & Rehabilitation, LLC v. Cook, 557 S.W.3d 286 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018) (arbitration agreement ambiguous where family member signed as "Responsible Party"; construed against drafter; no enforceable arbitration against resident)
- Robinson Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Phillips, 586 S.W.3d 624 (Ark. 2019) (supreme court approving Cook and holding "Responsible Party" signature did not create enforceable arbitration against resident when signer lacked authority)
- Pine Hills Health & Rehab., LLC v. Talley, 546 S.W.3d 492 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018) (refusing to bind resident where family member signed in representative capacity without authority)
- Broadway Health & Rehab., LLC v. Roberts, 524 S.W.3d 407 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017) (same)
- Progressive Eldercare Servs.-Chicot, Inc. v. Long, 449 S.W.3d 324 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014) (same)
