COLLINS v. THE STATE (Three Cases)
312 Ga. 727
Ga.2021Background
- Three co-defendants (Collins, Burdine, Love) were tried jointly for the April 21, 2012 shooting death of Milton Kelley; all were convicted of various offenses and sentenced to life plus consecutive terms.
- Evidence included witness testimony that the three planned a robbery earlier that day, sightings of firearms on defendants (9mm and a long/"pirate" gun), one defendant and another driving to Kelley’s house, cell‑tower location data placing Collins and Burdine near Kelley’s home, and post‑shooting behavior (burning clothes, hiding guns, statements by Love that he thought he had killed someone).
- Medical examiner: fatal close‑range gunshot to Kelley’s left eye; a 9mm shell casing was recovered from the garage; Kelley did not own guns and sold marijuana, including to Burdine.
- Jury verdicts: Love convicted of all counts (including malice murder); Collins convicted of felony murder (aggravated‑assault predicate) and other counts but acquitted of malice murder; Burdine convicted of felony murder (aggravated‑assault predicate) and other counts but acquitted of malice murder and some firearm counts.
- Post‑trial: motions for new trial denied; appeals consolidated in Georgia Supreme Court, which affirmed all convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence (Burdine) | State: evidence (planning, calls, phone locations, follow‑up actions) supports party liability for robbery and foreseeable deadly conduct. | Burdine: no proof he knew co‑defendants had guns or planned to assault Kelley; thus insufficient to convict as party to aggravated assault/felony murder. | Affirmed—evidence sufficient to infer shared criminal intent and foreseeability of deadly weapon use. |
| Severance motion denial (Burdine) | State: joinder proper—same incident, overlapping evidence, jury instructed to assess each defendant separately. | Burdine: joinder prejudiced him (antagonistic defenses, risk evidence imputed across defendants). | Affirmed—trial court did not abuse discretion; antagonistic defenses and risk of spillover did not show denial of due process. |
| Jury instruction on co‑defendant out‑of‑court statements / Bruton (Burdine) | State: limiting instruction and co‑defendant testified, so no Confrontation Clause violation. | Burdine: trial court added language allowing a testifying co‑defendant’s out‑of‑court statements to be used against others, violating confrontation and fair trial rights. | No plain error—co‑defendant testified and was cross‑examined; instructions did not violate Bruton. |
| Accomplice/corroboration and unknowing‑participant instruction (Collins) | State: evidence supported giving pattern charge that unknowing participants need not be treated as accomplices requiring corroboration. | Collins: several witnesses (drivers) were necessarily accomplices and their testimony required corroboration; the unknowing‑participant charge was improper. | Affirmed—slight evidence supported unknowing‑participant charge; instruction proper alongside accomplice‑corroboration teaching. |
| Voluntary manslaughter instruction (Love) | State: evidence showed self‑defense, not heat‑of‑passion killing. | Love: testimony of threats and that Kelley pulled a gun warranted manslaughter instruction as lesser included. | Affirmed—no slight evidence of sudden, violent, irresistible passion; self‑defense testimony does not support manslaughter charge. |
| Admission of Collins’s first‑offender adjudication (Collins) | State: admissible to prove element (first‑offender probationer) of a predicate for a firearm‑based felony‑murder count; limiting instruction given. | Collins: prior Street Gang Act violation prejudicial; counsel should have redacted or stipulated to status to avoid gang evidence. | Affirmed—adjudication was limited to element, not emphasized, limiting instructions given; any prejudice was minor and not outcome‑determinative. |
| Handling of jury’s legal question (Collins & Burdine) | State: refer jury back to the full charge; specific partial recharge risked undue emphasis. | Defendants: trial court should have answered or recharged on parties/conspiracy and related doctrines. | Affirmed—counsel agreed not to have a partial recharge; strategy reasonable and not constitutionally deficient. |
| Ineffective assistance claims (Collins & Burdine) | State: defense strategy and withheld objections were either meritless or tactical; Strickland not met. | Defendants: counsel failed to object to instructions, prosecutor comments, hearsay, admission of prior adjudication, and jury‑question approach. | Affirmed—no deficient performance or no prejudice; many objections would have been futile or were tactical decisions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review)
- United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (inconsistent jury verdicts do not require reversal)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
- Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560 (abolishing inconsistent‑verdict rule in Georgia)
- Kemp v. State, 303 Ga. 385 (party‑to‑crime liability where victim killed during robbery foreseeable)
- Cash v. State, 297 Ga. 859 (foreseeability of deadly weapon use by co‑actor)
- Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493 (party‑to‑crime inference from presence, companionship, conduct)
- Beck v. State, 310 Ga. 491 (voluntary manslaughter requires evidence of heat of passion)
- Draughn v. State, 311 Ga. 378 (standards for joinder/severance review)
- McElrath v. State, 308 Ga. 104 (stare decisis discussion on inconsistent verdicts)