Collins v. Saratoga County Support Collection Unit
528 F. App'x 15
2d Cir.2013Background
- Plaintiffs Everett B. Collins and Charles E. Collins, III (pro se) sued Saratoga County Support Collection Unit, Saratoga County Attorney’s Office, Richard Kupferman, and the New York State Division of Child Support Enforcement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Claims arose from (a) temporary suspension of Charles Collins’s driver’s license in connection with child‑support enforcement, and (b) delay in disbursing child support funds to Everett Collins.
- Plaintiffs alleged violations of procedural due process, equal protection, and civil‑rights claims against Kupferman for his role in restoring driving privileges.
- District court dismissed the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and denied leave to amend as futile. Plaintiffs appealed.
- Second Circuit reviewed de novo, applied Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard, and gave pro se submissions “special solicitude.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural due process for license suspension and delayed fund disbursement | Collinss contend suspension and delays deprived them of property/liberty without adequate process | Statutory/regulatory pre‑ and post‑deprivation administrative remedies and Article 78 judicial review provided adequate process | Dismissed — adequate administrative and judicial remedies defeated § 1983 procedural due process claim |
| Equal protection | Plaintiffs claim they were treated differently from similarly situated persons | Defendants say no factual allegations of unequal treatment compared to similarly situated individuals | Dismissed — complaint lacked necessary allegations of unequal treatment |
| Liability of attorney Kupferman (personal involvement) | Plaintiffs sued Kupferman for civil‑rights violations arising from his assistance restoring license | Defendants argue Kupferman lacked personal involvement in any constitutional violation | Dismissed — no allegations showing Kupferman’s personal involvement |
| Fourth Amendment / Substantive due process (forfeiture and merits) | Plaintiffs additionally (or in reply) suggest claims under Fourth and substantive due process | Defendants note these claims were not raised below and are meritless on law | Forfeited for failure to raise in district court; alternatively meritless — license suspension not a Fourth Amendment seizure and conduct not extreme enough for substantive due process |
| Dismissal without leave to amend | Plaintiffs sought chance to replead | Defendants argue amendment would be futile given legal defects | Affirmed — amendment would be futile because claims fail as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard governs Rule 12(b)(6) review)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (legal conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth)
- Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471 (pro se filings reviewed with special solicitude and construed to raise strongest claims suggested)
- Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (Fourth Amendment seizure requires meaningful interference with liberty or possessory interests)
- Harlen Assocs. v. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494 (substantive due process requires conduct so arbitrary as to be a gross abuse of power)
- Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (leave to amend unnecessary when amendment would be futile)